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Abstract
Cellular communication has become an important part of our daily life.
Besides using cell phones for voice communication, we are now able to access
the Internet, conduct monetary transactions, send voice, video and text
messages and new services continue to be added. The frequencies over
which voice is transmitted are public, so voice encryption is necessary to
avoid interception of the signal over the air. But once the signal reaches the
operators Base Station (BS), it will be transmitted to the receiver over a
wired or wireless mean. In either case, no protection is defined. This does
not seem a problem, but this is not true. Along the path across operator
network, voice is at risk. It will only be encrypted again, with a different key,
from the BS to the receiver if the receiver is herself a mobile user. Moreover,
voice encryption is not mandatory. The choice whether or not to accept an
unprotected communication is up to the network. When adopted, the same
encryption algorithm is used for sending SMS messages between mobile
telephones and base stations and for encrypting of calls. Unfortunately,
vulnerabilities in this encryption systems were already revealed more than
10 years ago and more continue to be discovered.
Currently the most popular communication technologies are the GSM and
the UMTS. The UMTS is in use as a successor to GSM. Along with mobile
phone services, It provides rapid data communication. The security algo-
rithms in UMTS differs from GSM in two important ways: encryption and
mutual authentication. Although security standards have been improved,
the end- to-end security is not provided.
At the time of this writing, the user who makes a call with another, remote,
user by means of a mobile network, is subject to several threats: phishing,
session hijacking and eavesdropping are such examples. This is mainly due
to the lack of either mechanisms for mutual authentication of the end point
of the conversation and the end-to-end digital encryption of the content of
the conversation.
In this Thesis we first give an overview about several generations of cellular
networks such as GSM and 3G and discuss their security issues and different
types of attacks. Then, we introduce novel end-to-end security systems
SPEECH and SEESMS for voice and text communications, respectively.
Finally, we move our attention to video-communication over UMTS. In
particular, we propose an end-to-end security systems for videotelephony
named SECR3T.
SPEECH is a software for making secure calls by using a Windows Mobile
powered handheld device and the GSM data communication channel. The
notion of security implemented by SPEECH is stronger than that available
in other secure conversation software, it includes the mutual authentication
of the end point of a conversation, the end-to-end digital encryption of the
content and the possibility to digitally sign the content for non-repudiation
purpose.
SEESMS is a software framework written in Java which allows two peers
to exchange encrypted and digitally signed SMS messages. The commu-
nication between peers is secured by using public-key cryptography. The
key-exchange process is implemented by using a novel and simple security
protocol which minimizes the number of SMS messages to use.
SECR3T is a full fledged secure communication system for mobile devices
based on the Circuit Switched Domain (CSD, in brief) of 3G networks. The
use of CSD is the most innovative contribute of the project since, to the best
of our knowledge, no solution is available for such a channel. Similarly to the
SPEECH project, the notion of Security implemented by SECR3T includes
the mutual endpoint authentication and the end-to-end channel encryption.
A SECR3T packet is recognized by the network as a frame of the native
videotelephony protocol which is 3G-324M. This allows a SECR3T client
to communicate also with a different video-client in a non-secured mode.
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For the majority of people cellular communication is a fundamental part of daily life.
Besides using cell phones for voice communication, people are now able to access the
Internet, conduct monetary transactions, send text messages and many other new ser-
vices continue to be added day by day. However the wireless medium has, as opposed
to the wired one, many limitations such as open access, limited bandwidth and systems
complexity. These limitations make it challenging, although still possible, to provide
security features such as authentication, integrity and confidentiality. Moreover, the
fact that the packet switched core of the current generation of 3G networks is connected
to external networks such as the Internet, make wireless communication vulnerable to
several types of attacks such as denial of service, viruses, worms etc. which have already
been used against hosts over the Internet. Therefore, it is important to provide users
with a secure channel for communication.
In this Thesis, we design and develop three communication systems to securely
carry out audio, text and video conversation.
This chapter gives an overview about the various generations of cellular networks.
For those not familiar with the cellular network architecture, a brief description of the
new 3G cellular network architecture is provided. Limitations of cellular networks, their
security issues and the different types of attacks are also discussed. The last part of the
chapter provides a brief introduction to our secure communication systems: SPEECH,
SEESMS and SECR3T.
1
1.1 Generations of cellular networks
1.1 Generations of cellular networks
Cellular Networks have been around since the 1980s and each year their subscribers
increase at a very fast rate. First generation (1G) networks were the first cellular
networks introduced in the 1980s. They were only capable of transmitting voice at
speeds of about 9.6 kbps max. In the US the system was known Advanced Mobile
Phone System (AMPS) and in Europe the Nordic Mobile Telephony (NMT). Both
these technologies used analog modulation to transmit data as a continuously varying
waveform.
1G systems had some limitations such as no support for encryption, poor sound
quality and inefficient use of the spectrum due to their analog nature. Second gen-
eration (2G) cellular networks also known as personal communication services (PCS)
introduced the concept of digital modulation meaning that voice was converted into
digital code, and then into analog (radio) signals. Being digital, they overcame certain
limitations of 1G systems. Various 2G technologies have been deployed around the
world. Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), North American Time Division Mul-
tiple Access (NA-TDMA) and digital AMPS (D-AMPS) have been deployed in the US
whereas Global System for mobile communication (GSM) has been deployed in Europe
and USA and Personal Digital Cellular (PDC) has been deployed in Japan.
Although 2G systems were a great improvement from 1G, they were only used
for voice communication. 2.5G is a transition step between 2G and 3G and it is also
known as data services over 2G. There have been several deployments of 2.5G across the
world. In the USA, they are known as 1xEV-DO and 1xEV-DV. In Europe or places
where GSM has been used, 2.5G technologies such as High Speed circuit switched
data (HSCSD), General packet Radio Service (GPRS), Enhanced Data Rate for GSM
Evolution (EDGE) have been deployed.
The Third generation (3G) standard is currently being deplyed as the next global
standard for cellular communications. It provides services such as fast Internet surfing
video telephony. There are three main technologies that are being applied. In the US
CDMA2000, in Europe Wideband CDMA (W-CDMA) and in China Time Division-
Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA). Although 3G has not been
fully deployed, people have already started talking about the fourth generation (4G)
technology. This generation will be designed to have data rates of up to 20Mbps. It will
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have support for next generation Internet such as IPv6, QoS and Mo-IP, lower system
cost and high capacity and capable of supporting communication in moving vehicles
with speed up to 250 km/hr.
1.1.1 2G and 2.5G
GSM is the most widely adopted 2G technology in the world. Although it was initially
employed in Europe, it has become a global technology with subscribers in about 197
countries. Its specifications were completed in 1990 and service began in 1992. This
chapter will not explain the implementations details of 2G/2.5G as long as it is out
of the scope of the Thesis, interested readers are encouraged to look at (1) for more
details. However, some of the data services which are part of the 2.5G extension are:
• Short Messaging Service (SMS): Transfer of messages between cell phones. Large
messages are truncated and sent as multiple messages.
• High-Speed Circuit-Switched Data (HSCSD): This was the first attempt at pro-
viding data at high speeds data over GSM, with speeds of up to 115 kbps. This
technique cannot support large bursts of data. HSCSD was not widely imple-
mented and GPRS became a more popular technique.
• General Packet Radio Service (GPRS): This technique can support large bursty
data transfers.
• Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE): The standard GSM uses
GMSK modulation. Edge uses 8-PSK modulation. GPRS and EDGE combined
provide data rates of up to 384 kbps.
• Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD): CDPD is a packet based data service.
CDPD is able to detect idle voice channels and uses them to transfer data traffic
without affecting voice communications.
CDMA is the primary 2G technology in the USA. CDMAOne, also known as IS-95a
was the initial technique. This technique allows users to use the entire spectrum and
can support more users than TDMA and GSM. Speed between 4.8 and 14.4 kbps can
be supported. The CDMATwo extension can provide data rates of up to 115.2 kbps.
The 2.5G extension to this technology can be divided into two techniques. 1xEV-DV
3
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uses one radio frequency channel for data and voice, whereas 1xEV-DO uses separate
channels for data and voice. These are fully compatible with both CDMAOne and its
3G replacement CDMA2000, to make the transition as easy as possible.
1.1.2 3G
3G is the next generation wireless cellular network whose aim is to provide a world
wide standard and a common frequency band for mobile networking. The International
Telecommunication Union (ITC) started the process in 1992, the result of this effort
was a new network infrastructure called International mobile telecommunications 2000
(IMT- 2000), with the 2000 signifying that this new technology would be available in
2000. Application services include wide-area wireless voice telephone, mobile Internet
access, video calls and mobile TV, all in a mobile environment. To meet the IMT-2000
standards, a system is required to provide peak data rates of at least 200 kbit/s. The
following is the list of objectives that IMT-2000 aims to receive (2)
1. To make a wide range of services, both voice and data available to users, irre-
spective of location.
2. To provide services over a wide coverage area.
3. To provide the best quality of service (QoS) possible.
4. To extend the number of services provided subject to constraints like radio trans-
mission, spectrum efficiency and system economics.
5. To accommodate a great variety of mobile stations.
6. To admit the provision of service by more than one network in any area of cov-
erage.
7. To provide an open architecture which will permit the easy introduction of tech-
nology advancements as well as different applications.
8. To provide a modular structure which will allow the system to start from small
and simple configuration and grow as needed, both in size and complexity within
practical limits.
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The 3rd generation partnership project(3) was formed in 1998 to produce specifica-
tions for UMTS, a 3G technology based on Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA)
radio interface and the extended GSM/GPRS network. A second radio interface also
exists called IMT Multicarrier (IMT-MC) which is being promoted by the 3GPP2
organization. This interface is backward compatible with IS-95 to make a seamless
transition to 3G. This proposal is known as CDMA2000.
1.1.2.1 3G - UMTS Architecture
To understand the threats to a network, one must understand the network infrastruc-
ture. UMTS is considered the most important 3G proposal. It is being developed as an
evolution of GSM and therefore based on the GPRS network which is a 2.5G technology
and the UTRA radio interface.
Figure 1.1: 3G network architecture
As can be seen in Figure 1.1 (4), the 3G network has two main parts
1. The Radio Access Network (RAN)
5
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2. The Core Network (CN)
The RAN consists of the existing GPRS/GSM RAN system which is connected to
the Packet Switched Network (PS-CN) and also to the circuit switched network (CS-
CN). The PS-CN will eventually connect to the UTRAN system as part of the full
transition to 3G. The UTRAN consists of subsystems, with each subsystem consisting
of one Radio Network Controller (RNC) which is connected to several Base Transceiver
Stations (BTN). The GRPS RAN has a similar architecture.
The Core Network consists of the PS-CN and the CS-CN. The PS-CN consists of
several information servers, the SGSN and the GGSN. Each SGSN connects one or
more RSC and BSC with the PS-CN. Its functionality includes access control, mobility
management, paging and route management (4). The GGSN is the logical gateway
to the Internet. The BG interface can be used to connect to another PS-CN or to
another carrier. The information servers provide several functions. The Home Location
Register (HLR) maintains subscriber information and the Authentication Center (AuC)
maintains authentication information. There are also IP based servers such as DNS,
DHCP and RADIUS servers which interact with the SGSN/GGSN and provide control
and management functions.
1.2 Security issues in cellular networks
The infrastructure for Cellular Networks is massive, complex with multiple entities
coordinating together, such as the IP Internet coordinating with the core network. For
these reasons, providing security on every possible network communication path is a
real challenge.
1.2.1 Limitations of wireless networks
Compared to Wired Networks, Wireless Cellular Networks have a lot of limitations.
1. Open Wireless Access Medium: Since the communication is on the wireless chan-
nel, there is no physical barrier that can separate an attacker from the network.
2. Limited Bandwidth: Although wireless bandwidth is increasing continuously, be-
cause of channel contention everyone has to share the medium.
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3. System Complexity: Wireless systems are more complex due to the need to sup-
port mobility and making use of the channel effectively. By adding more com-
plexity to systems, potentially new security vulnerabilities can be introduced.
4. Limited Power: Wireless Systems consume a lot of power and therefore have a
limited time battery life.
5. Limited Processing Power: The processors installed on the wireless devices are
increasing in power, but still they are not powerful enough to carry out intensive
processing.
6. Relatively Unreliable Network Connection: The wireless medium is an unreliable
medium with a high rate of errors compared to a wired network.
1.2.2 Security threats in cellular networks
There are several security issues that have to be taken into consideration when using
the cellular infrastructure for communications.
1. Authentication: Cellular networks have a large number of subscribers, and each
has to be authenticated to ensure the right people are using the network. Since
the purpose of 3G is to enable people to communicate from anywhere in the world,
the issue of cross region and cross provider authentication becomes an issue.
2. Integrity: With services such as SMS, chat and file transfer it is important that
the data arrives without any modifications.
3. Confidentiality: With the increased use of cellular phones in sensitive communi-
cation, there is a need for a secure channel in order to transmit information.
4. Access Control: The Cellular device may have files that need to have restricted
access to them. The device might access a database where some sort of role based
access control is necessary (5).
5. Operating Systems In Mobile Devices: Cellular Phones have evolved from low
processing power, ad-hoc supervisors to high power processors and full fledged
operating systems. Some phones may use a Java Based system, others use Mi-
crosoft Windows CE and have the same capabilities as a desktop computer. Issues
may arise in the OS which might open security holes that can be exploited.
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6. Web Services: A Web Service is a component that provides functionality accessi-
ble through the web using the standard HTTP Protocol. This opens the cellular
device to variety of security issues such as viruses, buffer overflows, denial of
service attacks etc. (6)
7. Location Detection: The actual location of a cellular device needs to be kept
hidden for reasons of privacy of the user. With the move to IP based networks,
the issue arises that a user may be associated with an access point and therefore
their location might be compromised.
8. Viruses And Malware: With increased functionality provided in cellular systems,
problems prevalent in larger systems such as viruses and malware arise. The first
virus that appeared on cellular devices was Liberty. An affected device can also
be used to attack the cellular network infrastructure by becoming part of a large
scale denial of service attack.
9. Downloaded Contents: Spyware or Adware might be downloaded causing secu-
rity issues. Another problem is that of digital rights management. Users might
download unauthorized copies of music, videos, wallpapers and games.
10. Device Security: If a device is lost or stolen, it needs to be protected from unau-
thorized use so that potential sensitive information such as emails, documents,
phone numbers etc. cannot be accessed.
1.2.3 Types of attacks
Due to the massive architecture of a cellular network, there are a variety of attacks
that the infrastructure is open to.
1. Denial Of Service (DOS): This is probably the most potent attack that can bring
down the entire network infrastructure. This is caused by sending excessive data
to the network, more than the network can handle, resulting in users being unable
to access network resources.
2. Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS): It might be difficult to launch a large
scale DOS attack from a single host. A number of hosts can be used to launch
an attack.
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3. Channel Jamming: Channel jamming is a technique used by attackers to jam the
wireless channel and therefore deny access to any legitimate users in the network.
4. Unauthorized Access: If a proper method of authentication is not deployed then
an attacker can gain free access to a network and then can use it for services that
he might not be authorized for.
5. Eavesdropping: If the traffic on the wireless link is not encrypted then an attacker
can eavesdrop and intercept sensitive communication such as confidential calls,
sensitive documents etc.
6. Message Forgery: If the communication channel is not secure, then an attacker
can intercept messages in both directions and change the content without the
users ever knowing.
7. Message Replay: Even if communication channel is secure, an attacker can inter-
cept an encrypted message and then replay it back at a later time and the user
might not know that the packet received is not the right one.
8. Man In The Middle Attack: An attacker can sit in between a cell phone and an
access station and intercept messages in between them and change them.
9. Session Hijacking: A malicious user can highjack an already established session,
and can act as a legitimate base station.
1.3 Secure communications systems
In this Thesis, three software systems for end-to-end Security are described. They
have been designed at the extent of addressing the security issues in cellular networks
described in Section 1.2.2 with particular attention to user authentication, eavesdrop-
ping and non-repudiation of the communication content. The three project are called
SPEECH, SEESMS and SECR3T. All of them are end-to-end security oriented and
run at application level both on mobiles devices and PC. For this reason they are not
able to resist to all the attack described in Section 1.2.3, infact, DOS and channel
Jamming attacks which are strictly related to the physical network, cannot be faced by
those software systems. Instead, attacks such as message forgery, replay, MITM and
eavesdropping can be efficiently withstood by those tools.
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1.3.1 SPEECH
SPEECH (Secure Personal End-to-End Communication with Handheld) is a software
system for making secure calls by using a Windows Mobile powered handheld device
and a wireless data communication channel. The security mechanisms included in
SPEECH cover the mutual authentication of the end point of a conversation, the end-
to-end digital encryption of the content of a conversation and the possibility to digitally
sign the conversation content for non-repudiation purpose.
SPEECH is able to operate on different types of network and adapt its behavior
to the bandwidth of the underlying network while guaranteeing a minimal-acceptable
quality of the service (currently GSM and TCP/IP networks are supported). This has
been achieved by adopting a very light communication protocol and by using a software
codec explicitly optimized for the compression of voice data streams while retaining a
good sampling quality. As a result, SPEECH is able to work in full-duplex mode, with
just a slight delay in the conversation, even when using a 9600 bps CSD communication
channels, such as the one provided by 2G GSM networks.
There are several application areas for SPEECH. For example, it can be used in an
economic transaction conducted over a public phone line to verify the real identities of
the parties who are participating to the transaction. Moreover, it guarantees against
the possibility for an eavesdropper to access the content of the conversation. Finally,
the non-repudiation feature ensures that either party of the call could not deny the
content of the conversation in a later moment.
1.3.2 SEESMS
SEESMS (Secure Extensible and Efficient SMS) is a software framework written in Java
which allows two peers to exchange encrypted and digitally signed SMS messages. The
communication between peers is secured by using public-key cryptography. The key-
exchange process is implemented by using a novel and simple security protocol which
minimizes the number of SMS messages to use. SEESMS supports the encryption of
a communication channel through the ECIES and the RSA algorithms. The identity
validation of the contacts involved in the communication is implemented through the
RSA, DSA and ECDSA signature schemes. Additional cryptosystems can be coded
and added to SEESMS as plug-ins.
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Special attention has been devoted to the implementation of an efficient framework
in terms of energy consumption and execution time. To this end, an experimental
analysis was conducted to determine which combination of cryptosystems and security
parameters were able to provide a better trade-off in terms of speed/security and energy
consumption. This experimental analysis has also been useful to expose some serious
performance issues affecting one of the cryptographic libraries that is commonly used
to implement security features on mobile devices. These issues have been tackled by
profiling the code of these libraries and determining the reasons of these bad perfor-
mance. Then, the performance of this library has been improved by implementing some
algorithmic and programming optimization techniques. The resulting code exhibits a
significant performance boost with respect to the original implementation, and requires
less memory in order to be run.
1.3.3 SECR3T
Voice and video communication tools are considered unreliable when used in mobile
context or in poor signal strength conditions. This is particularly true for IP connections
when routed on the Packet-Switched Domain (PSD) over 3G mobile networks.
The SECR3T (Secure End-to-End Communication over 3G Telecommunication
Networks) project aimed to give a solution to handle the lack of communication tools ex-
plicitly designed to increase the security level over the Circuit Switched Domain(CSD)
of 3G networks. SECR3T is a full fledged secure communication system for mobile
devices based on the native CS Domain of 3G networks. The use of CSD is the most
innovative contribute of the project since, to the best of our knowledge, no solution
is available for such a channel. Similarly to the SPEECH project, the notion of Se-
curity implemented by SECR3T includes the mutual endpoint authentication and the
end-to-end channel encryption.
Using SECR3T users are able to authenticate the peer either by means of X.509
digital certificates or by a pre shared passphrase. The adopted end-to-end security
mechanisms have been embedded within the native 3G-324M protocol and they have
been proved to be transparent to the network operators. A SECR3T packet is therefore
recognized by the network as a frame of the native videotelephony protocol 3G-324M.
This allows a SECR3T client to communicate also with a different video-client in a
non-secured mode.
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Relying on the CSD, SECR3T provides a better QoS with respect to the PSD based
solution for 3G networks and it requires less power consumption as the user is registered






GSM is the second generation technology for mobile phone communications. It was
accepted as the international standard for digital cellular telephony in the late 1980s,
and it started to be deployed in the 1990s. GSM replaced first generation cellular
phone systems, which were analog systems that could support only a limited number
of users. Two of the major systems that were in existence were the advanced mobile
phone system (AMPS), the standard chosen in the United States, and total access
communications system (TACS), mainly deployed in Europe. The downfall of first
generation systems was the need for greater capacity as well as a technology that could
support international communications. Static and cross-channel interference are major
annoyances with analog phones while nonexistent with digital. Last but not least,
security and privacy can be easily implemented on digital networks through encryption
methods.
Today GSM is one of the most widely deployed digital cellular telephone systems
in the world. Competing technologies are the United Statesdeveloped CDMA and
time division multiple access (TDMA). Although these technologies are intrinsically
incompatible, many phones today support multiple technologies, and mobile telephone
companies have made agreements to allow users to call and be reached independently
of the service offered in their coverage area.
When GSM was conceived and standardized by the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI), two security services were targeted: authentication and
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encryption. Since the goal for authentication was to allow the telephone company
to identify the user for billing purposes, only one-way authentication was requested,
whereas trust in the network was considered implicit. Encryption was designed to
protect the air link between the mobile user and the telephone operator ground antenna,
while communication confidentiality within the operator’s network was not taken into
account.
GSM security relies on symmetric key cryptography, a secret key Ki is shared
between the user and the network operator. This key is the secret used to perform
the authentication protocol and to calculate session encryption keys. If the value of
this key is revealed, an attacker may impersonate a victim as well as eavesdrop on
his conversations; for this reason, the standardization committee decided to store this
key in a smart card, which is a tamper-resistant device. Smart cards used in GSM
are called SIM cards. Besides storing the secret key Ki, the SIM card also provides a
protected environment within which sensitive cryptographic operations are performed.
Every SIM card is personalized (i.e., it contains the unique user identification IMSI
code and secret key Ki ). A SIM card can be moved from one handset to another
without the user having to change his subscription contract or his telephone number.
Another service offered by GSM is user anonymity for privacy protection. An IMSI
is a nonconfidential value linked to a particular user. IMSI knowledge would allow
identifying the user’s physical location worldwide, while use of a temporary identity,
known as temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI), can provide anonymity. The
TMSI is frequently updated (every time the user moves to a new location area or after a
certain time period) to avoid linking user information with TMSI. There are situations
where IMSI use is mandatory (e.g., on the first use of the mobile after purchase, on
the first use of the mobile under the coverage of another operator, or whenever the
provided TMSI cannot allow establishment of user identity).
ETSI defined three algorithms to achieve authentication, encryption, and encryption
key derivation from Ki. Input and output lengths as well as key lengths were specified.
Algorithm choice for authentication was left open, whereas encryption algorithms must
be standard to allow for roaming between operators.
Reference algorithms were designed by ETSI and kept secret from the public for
operator use only. A3 allows calculating the response SRES to a challenge RAND sent
by the network operator to the user. A8 uses the same RAND as input to calculate
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the encryption key Kc. A5 is the voice encryption algorithm. Algorithms A3 and A8
are often combined in a single algorithm referred to as A3/A8, the use of which is
to calculate the challenge response SRES and encryption key Kc given the secret key
Ki and the random input RAND. Besides reference A3/A8 algorithms, operators have
the option to implement proprietary algorithms, or published algorithms that fit the
requested characteristics. The mobile phone and the visited network must support the
same A5 algorithm to allow encrypted voice communication.
GSM security is based on triplets, including
• The challenge RAND
• The challenge response SRES
• The voice encryption key Kc
The algorithms to calculate SRES and Kc from RAND and the secret key Ki are
described in the following sections.
2.1.1 User authentication
Figure 2.1: GSM authentication
User authentication is achieved by performing a challenge response between the
network and the user. (See Figure 2.1) To be more specific, user authentication occurs
in the SIM card whereas network authentication occurs in the authentication center
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(AuC) or the home local register (HLR). If the mobile user is in a visited local register
(VLR) coverage area (i.e., an area under the coverage of an operator that has roaming
agreements with the operator the user subscribed to), the AuC or HLR transfer the
authentication results, success or failure, to the VLR.
Network authentication is not required in GSM, as the cost to build a rogue network
station was considered sufficiently prohibitive to put off potential attackers.
The algorithm A3 is implemented in the SIM card and the AuC or HLR. To authen-
ticate, the user receives a 128 bit random challenge RAND from the network. Using
the 128-bit secret key Ki algorithm, A3 computes a 32-bit challenge response signed
response (SRES) and transmits it to the network for verification.
The authentication procedure is outlined in the following steps:
1. Authentication is initiated by the user whenever he wants to make a call from his
mobile (MS) or go on standby to receive calls. The user transmits his identity
through TMSI and the authentication request.
2. The network establishes the identity of the SIM through the 5-digit TMSI. If the
TMSI is recognized, the VLR sends a request for authentication to the HLR; if
not, it will request the user’s IMSI.
3. The HLR generates a 128-bit random RAND challenge. Using the user Ki
and RAND, it applies A3 and calculates the expected SRESHLR. RAND and
SRESHLR are both sent to the VLR.
4. The VLR sends RAND to the SIM.
5. The SIM calculates the SRESSIM , using its secret key Ki and the challenge
RAND. SRESSIM is sent to the VLR for verification.
6. If SRESHLR = SRESSIM , then the SIM is authenticated and allowed access to
the network. If SRESHLR 6= SRESSIM , then an authentication rejected signal is




The frequencies over which voice is transmitted are public, so voice encryption is nec-
essary to avoid interception of the signal over the air. Once the signal reaches the
operator’s BS, it will be transmitted to the receiver over a wired or wireless mean. In
either case, ETSI didn’t define any protection: voice transmission in clear over a wired
means is publicly accepted, as this is what happens for fixed base telephone conversa-
tions, and voice transmission in clear over wireless portions of the network is supposedly
not at risk, as it is assumed that the attacker is not aware of the communication path
within the operator’s network. Voice will only be encrypted from the BS to the receiver
if the receiver is herself a mobile user. In the latter case, it should be noted that a dif-
ferent encryption key will be used between the caller and his base station and between
the receiver and her base station.
Voice encryption is not mandatory; the choice whether or not to accept an unpro-
tected communication is up to the network. A session encryption key must be computed
before a secure communication can take place. The encryption key Kc will change af-
ter each user authentication, since the same RAND value is used for encryption key
derivation.
The algorithm A8 is implemented in the SIM card and the AuC or HLR. To generate
the 64-bit encryption key Kc, the SIM uses the 128-bit random challenge RAND from
the network and the secret key Ki. Kc is transmitted to the MS for voice encryption.
The voice encryption algorithm implemented in a MS is A5. It’s a stream cipher
that takes Kc as input and produces a key stream as output. Ciphertext is obtained
by XORing the plaintext and the key stream.
Multiple versions of the A5 algorithm have been defined; the network and MS must
support at least one common version to communicate securely. The most widely used
A5 algorithm today is A5/3 (A5 version 3); it is based on Kasumi.
When a MS wishes to establish a connection with the network, it indicates which
version of the A5 algorithm it supports. If the MS and the network have no versions
of the A5 algorithm in common, the network decides whether to accept an unciphered
connection or to release the connection. If the MS and the network have at least one
version of the A5 algorithm in common, then the network selects the one of its choice.
The voice encryption procedure is outlined in the following steps:
17
2.1 GSM Security
1. The SIM card applies algorithm A8 to the 128-bit input RAND using key Ki to
calculate the encryption key Kc.
2. The SIM card transfers the encryption key Kc to the MS.
3. When the MS wants to establish a connection, it informs the network of the A5
algorithms it supports.
4. If the MS and the network have at least one version of the A5 algorithm in
common, then the network selects the one of its choice.
5. If the MS and the network have no A5 algorithms in common, the network accepts
an unciphered connection or releases the connection.
2.1.3 Other security features
SIM authentication and voice encryption are considered GSM main security features,
but a number of minor protections are also available. We have already mentioned
anonymity, which allows the concealment of the SIM’s permanent identity IMSI, linked
to a particular user’s identity. The same TMSI should not be used for a long time
period to avoid user traceability.
IMEI aims to reduce mobile phone theft. The network can request the IMEI of the
mobile station it’s communicating with. If the value provided corresponds to the IMEI
of a stolen phone, the network may interrupt the communication. Unfortunately, no
security feature protects IMEI integrity, so the barring of stolen phones depends on the
terminal providing the genuine IMEI to the network.
User-to-SIM authentication may be requested before a user is allowed to employ SIM
services. This proof, whose goal is to limit the use of stolen SIM cards, is generally
accomplished by PIN verification. PINs are generally 416 digits long, but users can
disable this feature. Also, to limit the use of a stolen mobile platform with a different
SIM card, mobile phone owners can pair their device with their SIM card. This feature,
known as SIM lock, allows a SIM card and a mobile platform to share a secret. The
SIM will be denied access to the terminal unless it can prove knowledge of the secret.
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2.1.4 Security limitations and attacks on GSM
A number of security limitations have been reproached to GSM. The most obvious is
its lack of support for mutual authentication, which enables an adversary to set up a
false BS and communicate with any user, since only user authentication is requested
and since the network can opt for non-encrypted communications.
As we’ve mentioned in previous sections, data within the network is not protected.
This concerns voice, which is transmitted in clear, as well as signaling information,
including cipher keys and authentication tokens. Any adversary that can access an
operator’s network from the inside will be able to impersonate victims or network
elements as well as eavesdrop on communications.
Yet another GSM design limitation is its lack of integrity protection. This is not a
major issue on voice communications, where throughput is more important than error
detection or protection and where personal voice characteristics allow us to recognize
who we are speaking to. Lack of integrity becomes an issue in GPRS, a technology
based on GSM, where data transmission is supported.
On top of design limitations, many GSM algorithms have been broken over the
years. First, the variable and key lengths are too short to be considered secure, given
the increase in computational power since the definition of GSM. The secret key Ki is
128 bits long, which is still acceptable today in symmetric key cryptography, but SRES
is only 32 bits long, giving a 216 chance of collision using the birthday paradox, and the
encryption key Kc is only 64 bits long. Even worse, in early versions of A5 algorithm,
only 54 of the available 64 bits were used for encryption.
Particular implementations of the A3/A8 authentication and cipher keygeneration
algorithms, as well as of the A5 algorithm have been breached. The first reference
version of the A3/A8 algorithm designed for mobile telecommunication operators, called
COMP128 v1, was broken in the early 1990s. COMP128 v1 was kept secret and was
not publicly revised. Once it leaked, it was attacked and broken. The first attacks by
Berkeley students in 1992 showed that by analyzing COMP128 v1 output on chosen
RAND values, the secret key Ki could be retrieved. Once Ki is known, an attacker
can clone a SIM card and impersonate a user or make calls at the expense of the victim
whose SIM card was cloned. Later COMP128 v1 was also broken by side channel
attacks based on power consumption (7).
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Early versions of the A5 voice encryption algorithm have also been reverse engi-
neered and broken. The A5 version 1 algorithm was broken in 1994 by an attack that
allows finding the voice encryption key by eavesdropping on a two-minute conversation
(8). In 1999, an attack on the weaker A5 version 2 was announced (9). Another attack
on A5 version 2 based on a ciphertext-only analysis of encrypted off-the-air traffic was
published in (10).
Elad Barkhan, Eli Biham, and Nathan Keller (11) have shown a ciphertext-only
attack against A5/2 that requires only a few dozen milliseconds of encrypted off-the-air
traffic. They also extended their attack against A5/1 and A5/3 on mobile phones that
support A5/2 by retrieving the key first used in an A5/2 algorithm and then switching
to another A5 version.
GSM networks lack the flexibility to quickly upgrade once security breaches are
identified. We described the encryption algorithm A5/3 and the authentication and
key generation algorithm MILENAGE, but these have not been widely adopted in
GSM.
2.2 3GPP Security
The 3GPP Agreement was signed in 1998 to complete a set of globally applicable
technical specifications for a 3G mobile system based on the evolved GSM core networks
and the radio access technologies based on UMTS terrestrial radio Access. A separate
standardization body, 3GPP2, is developing another third generation mobile cellular
system based on CDMA2000 and an evolution of the North American standard ANSI-
41.
3GPP security specifications describe both access security and network security.
Access security is improved by adding services not provided by GSM and correcting
GSM vulnerabilities by employing different algorithms. Network security is an entirely
new feature compared to GSM.
3GPP provides over-the-air mutual authentication between the user universal sub-
scriber identity module (USIM) and the network, encryption, and integrity of user and
signaling data.
Since 1998, the 3GPP technology has been evolving, and multiple releases of the
specification have been published. The first release of 3GPP specifications, release
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99 (12), was essentially a consolidation of the underlying GSM specifications and the
development of the new UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN). Innovative
services defined include multimedia messaging service to send text, audio, images and
video clips, location services to send user’s emergency and commercial data according
to their location, mobile station execution environment to allow a mobile station to
negotiate its execution environment, and access to the Internet or an ISP. In Release
4 (13), major security enhancements concern the definition of encryption algorithms
based on Kasumi and the establishment of mobile application part (MAP) application
layer security.
The main improvement in release 5 (14) is the ability to support IP-based com-
munication between network elements. Confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and
antireplay protection are obtained thanks to IPSec. Release 6 is now finalized.
2.2.1 3GPP authentication and key agreement
Figure 2.2: 3GPP authentication
3GPP provides mutual authentication and key agreement between the user USIM
and the network through the AKA protocol. (See Figure 2.2) AKA is a secret key
algorithm; a secret key K must be shared between the USIM and the HLR. It is the
HLR that generates authentication values and transfers them to the VLR of the network
under which coverage the user is located the moment authentication is performed.
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Authentication is requested by the USIM. Once the HLR has transferred authenti-
cation values to the VLR, exchanges occur between the USIM and the VLR. Authen-
tication values consist of a quintet (in analogy to GSM triplets) including:
• The challenge RAND
• The challenge response XRES
• The cipher key CK
• The integrity key IK
• The authentication token AUTN
The AKA procedure is outlined in the following steps:
1. Authentication is initiated by the user whenever he wants to make a call from his
mobile station or go on standby to receive calls. The user transmits his identity
through TMSI and the authentication request
2. The network establishes the identity of the USIM through the 5-digit TMSI. If
the TMSI is recognized, the VLR sends a request for authentication to the HLR;
if not, it will request the user’s IMSI
3. The HLR generates the AKA quintet Q = (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN ) and
sends it to the VLR
4. The VLR sends RAND and AUTN to the USIM
5. The USIM verifies if AUTN is acceptable, where AUTN is the network authen-
tication token. If AUTN is valid, the USIM calculates the expected response
XSRESUSIM using its secret key K and the challenge RAND. XSRESUSIM is
sent to the VLR for verification. The USIM also calculates the encryption key
CK and the integrity key IK
6. If XRESHLR = XSRESUSIM , then the USIM is authenticated and allowed access
to the network. If XRESHLR 6= XSRESUSIM , then an authentication rejected
signal is sent to the USIM and access to the network is denied
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The authentication algorithm was not standardized by the 3GPP organization be-
cause the architecture demands that every operator manages her users’ authentication
and sends the authentication quintet Q to the VLR. Nevertheless, the reference algo-
rithm MILENAGE, was designed and is used by most operators.
AKA was designed in such a way as to facilitate roaming and handover between
3GPP and GSM networks because it is expected that for a long transition period, both
networks will coexist. To ease roaming between 3GPP and 3GPP2 networks, 3GPP2
has decided to adopt AKA as its authentication and key agreement scheme as well.
2.2.2 3GPP encryption and integrity functions
Signaling system number 7 (SS7), defined by the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) for the PSTN in the 1980s, was the first de facto standard to be used for
communication within and between operators’ networks. No standard security means
are defined in SS7, since wired telephone operators rely on the private nature of the
network to infer that attacks will be limited. To adapt SS7 to wireless communica-
tions, the MAP protocol was developed and included in release 99. Wireless access to
operators’ networks nevertheless implies new breaches for attackers, so 3GPP devel-
oped security mechanisms specific to MAP (MAPsec) in release 4. MAPsec has been
improved throughout 3GPP releases.
Unfortunately, MAPsec provides some degree of protection only on the mobile part
of the signaling protocol, not on the entire SS7 protocol. Instead of defining a security
protocol for SS7, more and more operators are now switching to IP and IPsec for
security. Moreover, MAP can run on top of IP, leaving the choice between IPsec and
MAPsec for security.
2.2.2.1 MAPsec
MAPsec is an application layer security protocol, fully useful if applied by all intercon-
nected operators.
Before protection can be applied, SA must be established between the respective
MAP network elements. SAs define, among other things, which keys, algorithms, and
protection profiles to use to protect MAP signaling. Network operators negotiate among




Each SA contains the sending and receiving public land mobile network (PLMN)
identifier, a SPI to identify the SA, an integrity and encryption key and the respec-
tive algorithms to use, a protection profile identifier (to identify the security features
provided), and an expiration date for the SA.
An interdomain SA and key management agreement should
• Define how to carry out the initial exchange of MAPsec SAs
• Define how to renew the MAPsec SAs
• Define how to withdraw MAPsec SAs
• Decide if fallback to unprotected mode is to be allowed
• Decide on key lengths, algorithms, protection profiles, SA expiration times, and
so forth
The security services provided by MAPsec are
• Data integrity
• Data origin authentication
• Antireplay protection
• Confidentiality (optional).
MAPsec provides three different protection modes:
• Protection mode 0 : no protection
• Protection mode 1 : integrity, authenticity
• Protection mode 2 : confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
MAP messages protected by means of MAPsec consist of a security header and the
protected payload. In all three protection modes, the security header is transmitted
in cleartext. The protected payload format is described in (15). At present, the only
mandatory algorithms standardized in MAPsec are AES in counter mode with 128-





The security protocols to be used at the network layer to protect IP signaling traf-
fic are the IETF-defined IPsec protocols, a description of which is provided in (16).
In (17), 3GPP defined a minimum set of features required for interworking purposes.
IPsec is restricted to ESP and tunnel mode only. Also, key management and distribu-
tion between security gateways, defined next, is handled by the protocol IKE. Within
their own network, operators are free to use any IPsec feature, including the ones not
incorporated in (17).
3GPP defined security domain for network protection (i.e., a network in which the
same level of security and usage of security services is provided). Typically a network
operated by a single operator will constitute one security domain. Security gateways
are entities on the borders of the IP security domains and will be used for securing
native IP-based protocols. All IP traffic shall pass through a SEG before entering or
leaving the security domain.
The security services provided by IPsec are
• Data integrity
• Data origin authentication
• Antireplay protection
• Confidentiality (optional)
• Limited protection against traffic flow analysis when confidentiality is applied
At present, the only IPsec algorithms mandatory in (17) are 3DES and AES-CBC




A System for Secure GSM
Communication
3.1 Introduction
In these years we have been witnessing a significant growth of the telecommunication
market. This growth can be temporally divided in two phases. In a first phase the
telecommunication networks, such as the GSM mobile phone networks(18) or the In-
ternet, were growing autonomously and independently. A true interoperability between
these networks was substantially absent, both because of technical and economical rea-
sons. In a second phase, which is still in progress, several public communication net-
works are converging in a unified network which is accessible using the most disparate
devices. Such a shift has been driven by the recent technological advancements and
by the impressive push of the market. We cite, as example, the recent introduction
of mobile terminals which can indifferently operate on a GSM network or on a Wi-Fi
based network, or the availability of cheap flat rates for surfing the Internet through a
mobile phone connection.
Even in this renewed scenario, one of the most popular applications remains the
voice-based communication. A voice-based communication service is essentially a ser-
vice where someone uses some sort of address (e.g., a mobile phone number, a nick
name, an IP address) to contact and communicate, via voice, with a remote user by
means of a public communication network. There are essentially two types of security
issues related to this service. The first type concerns with the problem of trusting the
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other endpoint of the conversation (e.g., is he really the one he claims to be?). The
second type concerns with the problem of trusting the communication network (e.g., is
someone eavesdropping my conversation?).
Mobile communication networks have historically suffered of several serious security
weaknesses that were swept under the carpet by the telecom operators according to the
principle of security by obscurity (i.e., a system is secure because only authorized people
know how it works). Let us consider, as an example, the case of GSM based mobile
phone networks. GSM networks are essentially organized in a hierarchical way (see
(18)). The GSM enabled mobile equipments (i.e., the mobile phones) are connected to
the network through a wireless link with the ground base stations. The base stations
are the endpoint of the physical GSM network and are, on their turn, connected to the
local public switched telephony network (PSTN or ISDN).
The GSM standard introduces some mechanisms to secure conversations. Three
cryptographic algorithms are introduced to this end: A5, A3 and A8(7). A5 is used to
encrypt conversations, A3 is used for the authentication between the SIM card and the
BS, and A8 is used for performing the key agreement between the SIM card and the
BS. Instead, no standard security mechanism is defined for securing the ground based
part of the communication.
Unfortunately, the A5 algorithm, and some of its variants which are currently in use
by most of the GSM networks, suffers of some serious security weaknesses, as described
in the work of Golic(19) and of Barkan et al.(11). These weaknesses allow a determined
user to eavesdrop, at a relatively small cost, voice conversations on a public GSM
communication channel. It should also be pointed out that the security mechanisms
introduced by the GSM standard only apply to the communications occurring between
a mobile equipment and the base station it is connected to, while no standard security
mechanism for the wired part of the communication.
The problem of avoiding the eavesdropping of a GSM conversation becomes even
more dramatic with the progressive switch to the unified network because, in this case,
a mobile conversation ending in a network other than the GSM will be subject to the
security issues of all the communication networks it will traverse.
Another security problem that emerges from the interconnection of communication
networks is the user authentication problem. This is both a problem of trusting the
network and trusting the other endpoint of a conversation. In the traditional mobile
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phone networks, each user needs to be authenticated, through his SIM card, before
accessing the network. By the same token, each mobile phone number can be related
to a particular user. This implies that, given a mobile phone number, it is possible to
determine the real identity of the user who owns that number. Such a scenario does not
apply, e.g., to users connected by the Internet. In this case, the only information we
are supposed to know about a user is his IP address, which can be even masqueraded.
It is relatively easy for a user connected to the Internet to call, by means of a Voice-
over-IP software and a fake geographic number, a user of a mobile phone network while
impersonating another user. The arising problem is, in this case, to be able to verify
the real identity of the user we are going to talk to.
Finally, the last security issue we point out is the problem of non-repudiation of a
conversation. The current communication technologies do not provide users with the
ability to prove that the content of a past conversation has not been altered. Consider
the case of a commercial transaction conducted during a phone conversation. After
the conversation has ended, one of the two endpoints of the conversation could deny
its content and refuse to go on with the transaction. Notice that, in these cases, even
listening a recording of the conversation could not be enough to establish the truth
because one of the two endpoints could claim it has been altered by the other endpoint.
This is essentially a problem of trusting the other endpoint of a conversation. The
problem here is to not allow a user to deny the content of a conversation he has had in
the past.
Starting from these considerations, we believe there is need of a strong formula-
tion of the concept of secure conversation that should guarantee the following security
properties:
• Confidentiality. The content of the conversation is encrypted. It should be
unfeasible for a malicious user eavesdropping on the communication channel to
determine the real content of the conversation.
• Authentication. Each of the endpoints of the conversation has a proof about
the real identity of the other endpoint of the conversation.





There are an increasing number of software and/or hardware solutions that a user can
adopt in order to perform “secure” conversation using a mobile phone. We cite, as ex-
amples: Criptofonino(20), Cryptophone(21), Sectera(22), VectroTEL X8(23), SnapSoft-
ZX2(24) and SecureGSM(25). All these products work by establishing an encrypted
communication channel between the two endpoints of a conversation on the top of a
standard GSM data call. Encryption is performed by using standard cryptographic al-
gorithms such the AES(26) algorithm. Moreover, special care is taken in using ad-hoc
compression technologies which guarantee the possibility to transport the voice stream
at an acceptable quality while using a low-bandwidth communication channel such as
the one provided by the GSM standard.
In addition to these products, a new generation of voice communication software
based on Wi- Fi networks is starting to appear. These software run on handheld devices
connected to the Internet through a Wi-Fi connection and use the TCP/IP protocols
to perform secure calls with remote peers connected to the Internet using an equivalent
software. The most famous example of these applications is Skype(27).
It should be pointed out that all these solutions do only provide support for the
confidentiality of mobile conversations. They do all assume that the other endpoint
of a secure conversation is trusted. So, there is no explicit support for other security
features such as user authentication or non-repudiation of conversations. In addition,
the most part of these solutions is available as closed-source commercial products and
there is a general lack of information about the way the security feature they claim are
implemented.
3.3 SPEECH
SPEECH is a software system for making secure calls by using a Windows Mobile 2003
powered handheld device and a data communication channel. It works by digitizing
the input voice, processing it using some cryptographic algorithm and, then, sending
the out-coming data stream to the handheld device of the other endpoint of the con-
versation where it will be played. The confidentiality of conversation is obtained by
encrypting the input voice stream using the AES256 symmetric cipher. The encryp-
tion of the communication is done according to the end- to-end paradigm: this means
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that the voice stream remains encrypted along all the communication channel joining
the two endpoints of an ongoing conversation. Moreover, SPEECH sup- ports the au-
thentication of the peers of a conversation either by using X.509 digital certificates or
passphrases. Finally, non-repudiation of conversations is implemented through a digital
sig- nature scheme.
One of the noteworthy features of SPEECH is the ability to operate on different
types of communication networks (currently, GSM networks and generic IP-based net-
works). For this reason, SPEECH adapts the quality of the digitalized voice stream
to the bandwidth of the under- lying communication channel. The management of the
voice stream is done using Speex(28), an open source audio codec which, together with
a light communication protocol, allows to talk in full-duplex mode with good audio
quality and short delay over a standard GSM data connection.
Figure 3.1: SPEECH main window
Figure 3.1 shows the main SPEECH window. Figure 3.2 shows the options window
where the user can choose among security and communication channel parameters.
The SPEECH architecture, shown in Figure 3.3, is organized as a stack of five
independent modules. During a conversation, the input voice is sampled by the Audio
module in a voice data stream and is sent down through the other modules of the
architecture. These modules encode the voice data stream, compress it, encrypt it
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Figure 3.2: SPEECH options window
Figure 3.3: SPEECH architecture
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and, then, send it to the other endpoint of the conversation. The communication
between modules is defined through a standard interface. The main advantage of this
approach is that it keeps minimal the amount of changes needed to introduce new
features in the system, such as the support for a new type of communication channel
or the introduction of a new security feature.
All the modules of the SPEECH architecture work in a multi-threaded architecture
so to be able to process, at the same time, the voice stream outgoing to the other
endpoint of the conversation and the voice stream incoming from him.
In the following sections we examine in details the inner working of each module.
3.3.1 Audio module
The audio module is in charge of performing two tasks. First, it uses the microphone
device of the handheld it is running on for encoding the input audio stream. Audio is
sampled at a frequency of 8000Hz where each sample is represented using 16 bits.
Second, it plays the output audio stream received from the other endpoint of the
conversation using the system audio device.
3.3.2 Voice codec
This module compresses the input audio stream coming from the audio module and
uncompresses the output bitstream coming from the other endpoint of the conversation
through the lower levels of the stack. The compression and uncompression is done using
the Speex codec, an open-source software which uses an efficient audio compression
format optimized for processing voice conversations. It is based on the CELP(29)
codec and is designed to operate using bit rates ranging from 2 kbps to 44 kbps.
The compression factor is adapted to the bandwidth of the underlying communication
channel. An important advantage of the Speex co- dec is that it is, at the best of our
knowledge, the only open source codec that has been explicitly optimized to run on





The security module implements all the security features of SPEECH, such as peers
authentication, key agreement, stream encryption or the digital signature of an ongoing
conversation. It is automatically recalled whenever a new conversation is initiated as
well as to process incoming and outgoing voice data stream. A thorough discussion of
the security features available in the current implementation of this module is available
in Section 3.4.
3.3.4 WSP module
As previously said, one of the requirements of SPEECH was the ability to operate on
different types of communication channels such as GSM or Wi-Fi networks. This is an
engaging task because each type of communication channel is characterized by its own
performance (e.g., the round trip time of data packets, the bandwidth) and quality
of service (the error rate, the sup- port for retransmission of lost data packets). This
implies the need for a communication protocol which is light, efficient and, wherever
needed, reliable and which abstracts the details of the communication channel in use.
The WSP module implements the Whisper Session Protocol, a light session-based
communication protocol which can operate both on reliable and unreliable mode. It is
an evolution of the Nautilus Session Protocol(30) which is part of Nautilus, a generic
software for perform- ing secure half duplex voice conversations. The main difference
with respect to the original protocol is that the WSPl supports full duplex data trans-
mission. This required the introduction of several synchronization primitives and a
multi-threaded architecture needed for handling, at the same time, the outgoing and
the incoming voice streams.
Data packets exchanged by WSP are formed by a fixed length header and a variable
length block of user data. The header is made of 2 bits used to specify the type of
packet and 14 bits used to maintain a progressive sequence number used to detect gaps
in the communication. The current version of WSP supports the following types of
packets:
• Reliable. The receiver of this packet has to acknowledge to the sender its re-
ception. Whenever a new reliable packet has to be sent, a new unique sequence
number is generated and used to mark it. After the transmission, the sender
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waits from the receiver a packet of type Acknowledge carrying the same sequence
number. If the sent packet is not acknowledged within a fixed interval of time,
the packet is assumed to be lost and it is retransmitted.
• Acknowledge. This kind of packet is sent as an acknowledgement for a reliable
packet previously received. The sequence number field is filled with the number
of the packet to be acknowledged.
• Unreliable. The packet is sent without any acknowledgement.
3.3.5 WTP module
The WTP module implements the Whisper Transmission Protocol, a low-level data
transmission protocol which has been designed to abstract the primitives (e.g., establish
a new session, send or receive data) needed to perform voice calls over different types
of data communication channels. Currently, SPEECH offers two implementation of the
WTP protocol which use, in turn, a GSM based and UDP/IP based communication
channel.
In the GSM based WTP implementation, the user wishing to initiate a new con-
versation has to supply the mobile phone number of the other user he is interested to
talk to. The WTP module will try to establish a serial communication channel with
the destination of the call through a GSM data calls.
In the UDP/IP WTP implementation, the user wishing to initiate a new conver-
sation has to supply the IP address of the other user he is interested to talk to. The
WTP module will try to establish a connection with the remote user by means of UDP
datagrams.
In both cases, once the connection has been established, the initialization of the
conversation will be managed by the upper level of the SPEECH architecture.
3.4 The SPEECH security
In this section we introduce the security features available in SPEECH and the way
they are implemented by the security module (see Section 3.3.3).
34
3.4 The SPEECH security
3.4.1 User authentication and key agreement
Whenever two users try to initiate a new secure conversation, the two SPEECH instal-
lations running on their handheld engage in a key agreement protocol. The purpose
of this protocol is to agree on a common session key to be used for performing cryp-
tographic operations on the voice data stream and, optionally, to verify the identity
of the parties of the conversation. SPEECH supports three different forms of user au-
thentication and key agreement schemes, each with a different level of security. Those
schemas produce a shared random secret which is hashed in two encryption keys (one
for encryption and one for decryption) of the correct size for the symmetric cipher
currently in use.
• Basic key agreement. Whenever two users initiate a new conversation, the
SPEECH installation running on their handhelds use a vanilla implementation
of the 4096bit Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol(31) to agree on a common
secret key. This form of agreement does not guarantee to the user the identity
of the other end- point of the conversation but it is enough when we are just
interested in guaranteeing the confidentiality of a conversation.
• Passphrase based key agreement. Two users interested in having a secure
conversation choose a common passphrase. Whenever a new secure conversation
has to be initiated by these users, they will generate each a new session key using
the shared passphrase. The reuse of the same passphrase is always possible,
because the generated session key will be never the same as the key-exchange
algorithm which generates the common key is based on the exchange of encrypted
random values. This approach provides with a basic form of authentication since
it is expected that the passphrases are known only by their legitimate owners.
• Certificate based key agreement. Two users initiating a new secure conver-
sation own a legitimate X.509 digital certificate which has been previously loaded
in their de- vice. Moreover, the two devices are supposed to be loaded with the
certificate of the root certification authority of the user to be called. If these
conditions are met, the two parties use the standard TLS 1.0 protocol(32) to
perform the mutual authentication and keys agreement. The call originator plays
the client role of the TLS protocol while the receiver of the call play the server
35
3.4 The SPEECH security
role. According to the TLS specification, each client submits its X. 509 certificate
and provides its verification.
Notice that this is the only user authentication scheme that makes it possible to
activate the non-repudiation feature.
Those three protocols run on the top of WSP and use only packets marked as
reliable.
3.4.2 Key escrowing
Providing end users with the ability of performing strongly encrypted phone calls arises
once again the problem about balancing the preservation of individuals privacy and
national security interests. For this reason, the system to design should support an
ethical key-escrow allowing the decryption of a conversation if and only if a selected set
of disjoint agencies have authorized it.
All the three key agreement protocols supported by SPEECH produce session keys
in deterministic way starting from a larger non-deterministic common secret shared by
the endpoints of a new conversation. The key escrowing algorithm used by SPEECH
works as follows. Suppose there are n security agencies we want to involve in the key
escrowing process and that each of these agencies has revealed its public key. At the
beginning of a new conversation, the secret shared by the two users is split in n disjoint
segments, where each segment is encrypted using the public key of the corresponding
agency. Then, each segment is sent to the corresponding agency. If, in a later moment,
there is need to escrow the key used to secure a past conversation, the agencies will
decrypt their fragments and assemble the original secret.
The problem that arises in this protocol concerns with the transmission of the
fragments of the secret to all the agencies that participate to this process. As a matter
of fact, it is not possible to always assume the possibility for a handheld device running
SPEECH to establish several connections toward different destinations at the same
time (e.g., a GSM based smartphone would only be able to make a GSM data call
at time). For this reason, we decided to not de- liver the encrypted secret fragments
directly to each agency, but simply to put them on the communication channel before
starting the conversation (i.e. sending them to the peers). In this way, all the agencies
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eavesdropping on the communication channel will get a copy of the encrypted secret
fragments together with the whole conversation.
The key escrow process we developed is considered ethical because no agency can
access private data without the agreement of all the others. Moreover, it is possible
to extend this mechanism by using a different partitioning scheme, such as the one
documented in (33), so to allow a subset of all the agencies to rebuild the session key.
3.5 Confidentiality
All the conversations made with SPEECH are encrypted using the AES256 symmetric
cipher with 128 bit block size and 256 bit key generated according to the common secret
agreed using one of the approaches described Section 3.4.1. The cipher mode we use
is OutputFeedBack (OFB). This mode works by repeatedly encrypting an initial vector
and processing with the xor operator the resulting 128 bit together with the original
128 bit data block. This is a suitable operative mode for our communication channel.
The choice of the OFB mode has been done by considering that when using a wireless
communication channel like the one provided by GSM networks or by Wi-Fi networks
the number of data losses or communication errors is relatively high. By using the OFB
mode, we are guaranteed that an error occurring in a data block will not propagate
over the entire blocks chain.
3.6 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation of a conversation is implemented in SPEECH by having each party
of the conversation sign, with his private key, the hash of a recording of the whole
conversation. The problem that arises is to make it possible for both parties to have,
at the end of the communication, the same identical copy of the conversation. Such a
task is not easy as it seems because both the underlying communication channel and the
transport protocol may be unreliable and, so, voice packets can be damaged or be lost.
For this reason, SPEECH adds to each packet of the encrypted voice stream an integrity
checksum and a sequence number. The first is used to verify if a received package has
been damaged by the transmission, the second is used to detect lost packets.
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At the end of conversation, the total number of damaged and lost packets is eval-
uated. If a certain threshold is not exceeded, then the party will request to the other
party a copy of all the packets to be recovered using a reliable protocol. Otherwise, if
the threshold is exceeded, the non-repudiation service becomes unavailable. The defi-
nition of the threshold is crucial because accepting a large number of contiguous errors
may alter the real meaning of the conversation; in other words peers could not be aware
of what they are signing1. Another reason for bound- ing the number of packets to
recovery is that the downloading of a large number of recovered packets may take a
long time to finish. Finally, if the rebuilding process was successful, the parties use a
reliable protocol to exchange the checksum of the whole conversation. Each user can
later listen the conversation and decide to send or not the signature. This feature has
been implemented by means of standard public key cryptography, such as RSA with
SHA-1(34).
1Adopting the same criteria introduced by current laws about digital signature, assuming that
signer MUST visualize the document before signing it.
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A System for Secure and
Efficient SMS Communication
4.1 Introduction
SMS messages are currently one of the most widespread forms of communication. As
reported by (35), in 2009 worldwide SMS traffic topped five trillion messages, and that
figure is set to exceed 10 trillion in 2013. Sending an SMS is cheap, fast and simple. The
success of SMS messages has motivated many researchers to explore fields of application
as an extension of their original purpose. We have seen many unusual or strange
applications, such as devices which allow the switching on and off of house heating
systems using an SMS (36). Alternatively, through SMS, whenever the temperature of
a refrigerator exceeds a certain threshold, it is possible to automatically communicate
the problem (37). Indeed, through SMS, fridges can even signal when they are running
out of beer (38).
Along this path, we also have been experiencing a multitude of services which
allow users to order financial transactions (often, microtransactions) by sending SMS
messages. This is the case, for example, of the service provided by the Province of
Rimini Mobility Agency, in Italy, which allows registered users to buy electronic tickets
using a simple SMS which contain a standard fixed string of text (39). Users are able




Many of these services seem to ignore one important drawback of SMS based com-
munication: the substantial lack of security. For example, by using bulk SMS service
providers it is relatively simple to forge an SMS and send it to a recipient, as if it was
transmitted by any sender. So, services like the ones we mentioned before are prone
to be attacked by malicious users (40). In this case, for example, it would be easy to
damage a user of the service by just sending to the Mobility Agency servers several
forged SMS that have apparently been originated by that user, thus forcing the user to
buy a multitude of tickets.
Two are the major security vulnerabilities affecting SMS based communication: the
lack of confidentiality during the transmission of a message and the absence of a stan-
dard way to certify the identity of the user who sent the message. These vulnerabilities
originate from the protocol used to exchange SMS messages and from the infrastruc-
tures used to implement it. There are currently several proposals, mostly coming from
the scientific research, about how to secure SMS messages. Some of these proposals
require security to be injected at the protocol level. Instead, most of them consist of
software frameworks which can be installed on mobile phones and/or on the SIM cards
in order to implement security features.
This chapter presents a novel contribution to this field, consisting of a software
framework which allows two peers (end users and/or software applications) to exchange
SMS messages in a secure way. This proposal differs from the ones already existing in
literature, because it allows users to choose which cryptosystems and security param-
eters to use when sending a secure message, in order to achieve the optimal trade-off
between the requirements of the user, the cost and the efficiency of the operation. For
this reason, this chapter presents also an experimental analysis aimed at evaluating the
efficiency of the cryptosystems implemented in the framework under several usage con-
ditions, so to give users a better insight regarding the cryptosystems to use according
to their requirements. This analysis has also been useful to expose some serious perfor-
mance issues which seem to exist in one of the cryptographic libraries commonly used
to implement security features on mobile devices and which contradicts the theoretical
expectations about the performance of the ECDSA algorithm. In the last part of the
chapter, these issues have been investigated and an optimized version of this library
has been developed. The cryptosystems using this new library exhibit a significant
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performance boost, a lower memory footprint as well as a behavior that is consistent
with theoretical expectations.
4.2 Related works
There have been several proposals up to now to secure SMS based communications on
a GSM network. A first category of contributions tries to address these problems by
changing the original GSM specifications in order to introduce security features. This is
the case, for example, of the proposal presented by (41) which argues for a modification
of the GSM protocol at the transport level to achieve confidentiality between mobile
equipment (ME) and the GSM base station (BS) connected to it. The advantage of this
approach, if followed, is that it would be able to inject security features at infrastruc-
tural level, thus allowing to strengthen the entire communication network. However,
it is unlikely that these proposals will be implemented and widely adopted in the near
future, mostly because of the technical difficulties arising from the implementation of
structural changes in a well established network architecture like the GSM one.
A second category of contributions to secure SMS communication — which is be-
coming viable because of the increasing diffusion of ME with advanced computational
capabilities — introduces security features through the implementation of security
schemes at the application level. The resulting software frameworks can be catego-
rized according to the place where the application implementing the security scheme,
and their cryptographic keys, are stored. The first possibility is to locate the applica-
tion and its keys in a programmable SIM card used by the ME. This solution is adopted
by systems like the one developed by (42) or by (43).
The use of a programmable SIM card has several advantages, such as the tamper
resistance of the card and the possibility to move it from one ME to another without
any data loss. However, it also has a relevant drawback: the limited computational
capabilities of a programmable card do not allow the execution of complex security
schemes within a reasonable amount of time.
An alternative approach, adopted in systems like the one presented by (44), is to
use a SIM card only to store the cryptographic keys used in a scheme, while using the
computational capabilities of the ME to run the scheme. In addition, it is also possible
to use a SIM card to perform certain cryptographic operations, while executing the
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remaining part of the application through the ME, like in the mobile payment scheme
presented by (45).
Even just storing the cryptographic keys on a SIM card has an important disad-
vantage: the user is tied to the SIM provided by a particular operator and the inter-
operations with SIM cards relative to other operators may be difficult or impossible to
achieve.
These disadvantages can be largely overcome by working at the application level,
without using the SIM card at all. This approach is used by systems like SafeSMS (46),
MIABO (47) and the systems described by (48) and by (49), which adopt a simple key
management scheme based on pre-shared passphrase and/or public-key cryptography.
As those systems belong to the Person-to-Person (P2P) model only, they are suitable
for a restricted set of users and the security level ensured is strictly related to the key-
distribution scheme. In literature, there are other systems targeted for Client-Server
(CS) scenarios (e.g., m-commerce, homeland security) in which the involved entities
are not just humans, but also authorities which supply services (e.g., banks, CA, se-
curity agencies) through applications running on servers. Some available solutions to
such problems are: Trusted-SMS (50) and SMSSec (51). The Trusted-SMS frame-
work (TSMS) allows users to exchange non-repudiable SMS by means of the ECDSA
algorithm. Three different entities take part into TSMS: a service supplier which is re-
sponsible for providing services, a CA which manages keys, and the ME which uses the
supplied services by means of a J2ME midlet. TSMS presents two provisional scenarios
and two transactions scenarios which differ in the role that CA has in key management.
SMSSec is an end-to-end protocol with the object of providing SMS security. It does
not require any private-key to be stored in the mobile device, but provides user authen-
tication and encryption by means of a PIN code running an ad hoc protocol with an
Authentication Source (AS) authority. SMSSec uses symmetric (AES) and asymmetric
(RSA) cryptography for the encryption and key-agreement respectively. On one hand,
this approach allows a fast encryption process, while not altering the size of the SMS.
Whereas, on the other, prior to any transactions, there is need of a new key-agreement




Sending or receiving SMS messages is a common habit for most of the people using
a cellular phone. The general expectations are that mobile equipment should be able
to promptly send and receive a message with almost no delay. The way of sending
and receiving secure SMS messages could change this habit since it involves processing
incoming/outcoming secure messages which may be of several seconds. Thus, the effi-
ciency of these systems is almost as important as the security they guarantee. Moreover,
the efficiency of a system for guaranteeing secure SMS messages is heavily influenced by
the same ingredients which govern its own security: in other words, the cryptosystems
and the security parameters it uses. The user should be given the possibility to choose
to trade part of the security of a system with shorter response times, and vice-versa.
Moreover, such a customization should be allowed on a per-message basis, because the
same user might need to send messages, even to the same recipient, with different lev-
els of security. As a matter of fact, all the systems for sending secure SMS messages
presented so far in literature are bound to a particular cryptosystem. While this choice
simplifies their development, it may have a negative effect on their ability to meet the
requirements of the users, as we said above.
By keeping this in mind, we designed SEESMS, a Java based framework for ex-
changing secure SMS that aims to be efficient by supporting several cryptosystems
through a modular architecture. This choice offers the advantage to easily experiment
and assess the performance of several cryptosystems using several security parameters.
The same advantage holds also for the final users, as they may choose which combi-
nation of cryptosystem/security parameters better suit their needs. SEESMS works at
the application level (see Section 4.2) and can be used for exchanging secure SMS in
the P2P and in the CS scenarios. It can be seen as a tool that uses an SMS based
communication channel as bearer service to exchange encrypted, non-repudiable and
tamper-proof messages. The current version of SEESMS supports some of the most
used digital signature schemes (i.e. RSA, DSA, ECDSA (52)) and public-key based
cryptosystems (i.e. RSA, ECIES (53)). Comparing to other key-management mecha-
nisms (such as PGP), SEESMS uses a centralized and lightweighted implementation in
which only a central authority can distribute signed public-keys.
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The Java language has been chosen for the implementation of the framework because
it is widely adopted in mostly all the mobile phones, ranging from the old-fashioned
models to the latest ones. The cryptographic library used for implementing SEESMS is
(54) (BC). To our knowledge, this is the only existing Java library available for mobile
devices that supports RSA, DSA, ECIES and ECDSA algorithms together.
4.4 The architecture
The SEESMS framework adopts a hybrid architecture. If a user is interested in send-
ing/receiving a secure message through SEESMS and has never used it before, then
he has to contact a trusted third-party server, called Secure SMS Management Center
(SSMC), to request a customized copy of the SEESMS client application. Similarly, if
the user has already installed the SEESMS client, but does not own the public-key of
the recipient of the message (or the public-key of the user who sent him a secure SMS
message), he has to contact the SSMC server to ask for a copy of his key (this behavior
is similar to the PGP key-servers). Instead, if the user already owns the public-key of
his recipient, he will establish a direct communication in a peer-to-peer fashion, with-
out further interaction with the SSMC server. Due to the use of a standard interface
definition, all the cryptosystem engines have the same interface resulting in the ability
to load them in the framework seamlessly.
The following sections describe in details the SEESMS software components and



























Figure 4.1: The architecture of SEESMS
4.4.1 Secure SMS management center
The SSMC is in charge of handling the provisioning process, used to deliver to new users
a customized copy of the SEESMS client application, and the key-distribution process,
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used to send the public-keys of registered users following a client request. The entire
communication with clients is done by using signed SMS messages. The application
includes the following modules:
• Registration Service (RS). The RS is used to register new users, to provide
them a copy of the SEESMS client application and to run key-exchange protocols
with them. More details about these functions are provided in Sections 4.5.1 and
4.5.2.
• Server Message Handler (SMH). The SMH is a module that can be used
to exchange messages with another peer by means of SMS messages. It also
includes the code needed to serialize/deserialize SMS messages and send/receive
them through a GSM modem.
• Secure Storage (SS). The SS implements a secure local storage area used to
encrypt and to maintain sensitive data about the users that are registered to
the service, such as their public-keys or their registration information. Data is
encrypted using the AES symmetric cipher and stored in a relational database.
• Cryptosystem Engines (CE). The CE are the modules that take care of se-
curing the messages exchanged with a remote user. Each CE carries the im-
plementation of a cryptosystem and offers up to three standard set of func-
tions: Key Generation, Message Encryption/Decryption and Message Signa-
ture/Verification. These engines are used by the SSMC to implement the user
registration phase and the key-exchange protocol. The current version of SEESMS
includes the engines implementing ECC (ECDSA and ECIES), RSA and DSA.
4.4.2 SEESMS client
The SEESMS client application can be used by two parties to exchange encrypted and
digitally signed SMS messages. It includes the following modules:
• Message Handler (MH). The MH is responsible for sending and receiving
secure SMS messages. It is a trimmed version of the SMH, not including the code
needed to handle communication over a GSM modem.
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• Secure Storage (SS). The SS implements a secure local storage area used to
hold sensitive data such as the cryptographic keys of a user.
• Cryptosystem Engines (CE). Similarly to the SSMC case, the CE are used to
implement the registration phase and the key-exchange protocol and, moreover,
all the functions related to secure communications with another user.
• Keys Communicator (KC). The KC module implements the client-side key-
exchange protocol described in Section 4.5.2 which is used to communicate to the
SSMC the cryptographic keys generated by the client.
4.5 SEESMS in action
This section describes all the phases concerning the transmission of a secure message
with SEESMS, assuming that the sender of the message has been using the framework
for the first time.
4.5.1 Provisioning of the client application
A user interested in exchanging secure SMS messages using SEESMS firstly has to
download and install a copy of the application using the RS offered by the SSMC.
The provisioning process takes several steps:
1. The user registers on a web site hosted by the SSMC and asks for a copy of the
client application.
2. The RS generates a random string, called nonce, used in a subsequent phase of the
registration process (step 4) to ensure that the user running the client application
is the same that has requested for it. The nonce is split in two parts: the first
part is communicated to the user through the registration web page and email,
the second part is hard-coded in the copy of the client application that will be
delivered to that user.
3. The RS creates a software package containing the second part of the nonce gen-
erated in the previous step and the public-key of the server, and publishes it on a
web site hosted by the SSMC. A WAP-Push message indicating the URL where
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the package (just created) has been published, is sent to the phone number speci-
fied by the user during the registration phase. The URL is randomly generated in
order to avoid the possibility for an attacker to download a copy of the application
instead of the legitimate user.
4. The user downloads and installs the client on his mobile equipment and starts
the application. During the first execution, the user inputs the part of the nonce
received in step 2 of the registration process. The nonce is thus reassembled by
combining this part with the other part embedded in the downloaded package in
order to be used later (see the Section 4.5.2).
At the end of the initialization, the user inputs a passphrase that is used to generate
a pair of cryptographic keys which are subsequently stored in the SS of the client
application.
4.5.2 Key-exchange protocol
The public-keys generated by the user at the end of the provisioning phase must be sent
to the SSMC server. The transmission must be performed in such a way to guarantee
that the communication originates from the same user who downloaded the application
in the previous phase.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the case when the user has only one pair
of cryptographic keys: the private-key (SKu) and the public-key (PKu). Moreover,
let Nu be the part of the nonce generated and sent to the user during step 2 of the
provisioning phase (see the Section 4.5.1). The key-exchange protocol between a new
user and the SSMC server requires the following steps.
The client:
1. composes a message T containing his phone number and a timestamp;
2. computes H as the keyed-hash (HMAC) of T||PKu using the key Nu;
3. composes a message T′ containing T and H;
4. computes D as the result of the decryption of the message T′ using the private-key
SKu;
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5. sends to the server an SMS message M containing D and the public-key PKu.
After receiving the message M, the server:
1. reads from M the public-key PKu and the value D;
2. computes T′ as the result of the encryption of D with the public-key PKu con-
tained in M;
3. extract from T′ the fields T and H;
4. computes H′ as the keyed-hash (HMAC) of T||PKu using, as a key, the nonce Nu
generated for that user;
5. extracts from T the phone number of the user, the timestamp and keyed-hash H;
6. checks the timestamp to avoid reply attack. If the check is successful, compares
the extracted tag H with H′ computed at step 4. If the tags are identical, the
public-key of the user is saved in the SS, a signed confirmation SMS is sent to
the client and the registration process ends correctly. Otherwise, the registration
process ends with a failure.
From this moment on, all the SMS messages involved in the communications be-
tween the client and the SSMC will be signed. Moreover, due to the HMAC verification,
Man-In-The-Middle attacks will be easily detected and reported.
4.5.3 Exchange of a secure message
SEESMS implements secure SMS messages exchange by using binary SMS messages
rather than traditional textual messages. Each binary SMS message can hold 140 bytes
(equivalent to the 160 7-bit characters used for textual messages). The 140 bytes are
partitioned as shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: SMS Payload organization
The first two fields (i.e., UDH size and UDH Source and Destination Port) represent
the SMS User Data Header (UDH), a standard extension to the GSM specifications
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which allows to deliver the message to an application listening on a specific port at the
receiver ME. The subsequent 9 bytes are used to specify the message type (1 byte) and
the timestamp (8 bytes). The Msg Type field indicates the cipher used to process the
current message and the key length used by the cipher (e.g., 1024 bits RSA public-key
or 160 bits ECIES encrypted text). The Timestamp field marks the time when the
message has been sent. Finally, the Data field is used by the chosen cryptosystem to
carry the content of the message together with cryptographic tokens such as signatures,
public-keys and so on.
Suppose a registered user is interested in sending a secure SMS message to another
user through SEESMS. If he already owns the public-key of the recipient, then he has
just to input which cryptosystem to use, the corresponding security parameters and
the text of the message to be sent. The input message is processed by the chosen
cryptosystem and one or more SMS messages are generated and sent to the recipient.
If the public-key of the recipient is not known, then the user application sends to
the SSMC server the phone number of the recipient, asking for his public-key. The
SSMC responds with an SMS signed with his own private-key, containing a copy of the
public-key of the recipient (if it exists).
4.6 Experimental setup
Several tests have been conducted in order to evaluate the efficiency of the crypto-
graphic algorithms available with SEESMS and to determine which security configura-
tion would better suit the needs of a user. The framework is designed to handle any
kind of cryptographic operations. Nevertheless, in the tests have been evaluated only
the signature operations because otherwise it would have implied a longer exposition.
Moreover, this choice is justified by the observation that signing operations have a
computational complexity similar to the encryption ones.
This section briefly discusses the cryptosystems involved in our experiments and
describes the security equivalence with respect to their key sizes.
4.6.1 Input cryptosystems
The cryptosystems included in our experimentation are RSA, DSA and ECDSA. The
RSA cryptosystem is the most widely used public-key based cryptosystem. It may
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be used to provide both secrecy and digital signatures and its security is based on
the intractability of the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP). The Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) is the first digital signature scheme to be recognized by a government.
Its security relies on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) that is shown to be as hard
as the IFP. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) has been proposed
as an ANSI X9.62 standard. Unlike the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) and the
Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP) has no subexponential-time algorithm. For this reason, the “strength-per-
key-bit” is substantially greater in an algorithm that uses elliptic curves.
Since the ECDLP appears to be harder than the DLP (or the problem of factoring
a composite integer n), cryptography using elliptic curves offers the same security level
of RSA and DSA with smaller keys. A detailed presentation of the security-equivalent
configurations is described in (55) and summarized in Table 4.1.









The tests compare the performance of RSA, DSA and ECDSA when signing random
messages of fixed length using an increasing level of security. A message is signed by
hashing it using the SHA1 algorithm and, then, signing the resulting text using one of
the supported algorithm. All the cryptographic algorithms have been evaluated using
different key sizes ranging from 512 to 3.072 bits, for RSA and DSA algorithms, and
from 112 to 256 bits, for ECDSA. This work analyzes the performance of the three
algorithms by comparing them using the security-equivalent configurations described
in Table 4.1. For the sake of brevity, in the results have been reported only RSA and
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DSA security configurations, thus referring the interested reader to the above mentioned
table for the equivalent ECDSA security configuration.
All the collected data and results have been averaged on 200 different runs. The
measurements have been conducted on two widely available mobile devices: the Nokia
N95-8GB (Symbian OS 9.2 - CPU 332 MHz) and the HTC S620 (Windows Mobile 5.0
- CPU 201 MHz).
The expectations about these tests were that ECDSA would perform much better
than RSA and DSA when producing a digital signature. Furthermore, we expected that
RSA and DSA to process a digital signature verification much faster than ECDSA.
4.7.1 Time efficiency
We evaluated the time efficiency by measuring separately the time elapsed to sign and to
verify a single generic message. These two measurements report the time that the user
has to wait every time he sends and receives a secure SMS message on the ME, provided
that it has already been configured. The execution times have been evaluated by using
the System.currentTimeMillis() primitive available within the J2ME framework.
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show the time needed to digitally sign an SMS using, respectively,
an HTC S620 and a Nokia N95-8GB. Despite the expectations, the RSA algorithm
performs generally better than ECDSA. The DSA algorithm is slightly faster than
RSA for small key sizes, however it is only available with keys no longer than 1.024
bits. The only case where ECDSA outperforms RSA is when using very long keys (near
3.072 bits). This behavior is worth of further investigation because it is widely known





























































Figure 4.4: Nokia N95-8GB average signature generation time
Concerning the signature verification process, the RSA algorithm performs much
better than ECDSA and slightly better than DSA (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6). This is
partially what it is expected because, for public-key operations, RSA can benefit of the
public exponent size which, according to the algorithm, is often a prime close to a power
of 2 (e.g., 3, 5, 7, 17, 257, 65.537). However, we were surprised to notice such a big
difference between the performance of RSA and ECDSA. For example, when using key
sizes of 1.024 bits, RSA (∼ 15 ms) was approximately 300 times faster than ECDSA






























Figure 4.5: HTC S620 average signature verification time
These results seem to indicate that ECDSA performs, in practice, worst than ex-
pected. In order to further investigate this behavior, the memory usage was profiled
when signing a message by mean of the Sun Java Wireless Toolkit Memory Profiler
(WTK). The results, presented in Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9, show that not only ECDSA
has much higher memory requirements than RSA and DSA, but also that during the































Figure 4.6: N95-GB average signature verification time
repeatedly allocated and deallocated. This behavior is likely to be due to the activity
of the Garbage Collector module used by the Java virtual machine which runs the ap-
plication. This module is automatically activated by the system whenever the memory
usage of an application reaches a certain upper threshold, and its reaction is to reclaim
(and to free) all the memory that is not in use anymore. The overhead due to mem-
ory allocations and deallocations is likely to be responsible for the bad performance of
ECDSA. As shown below, even the bigger power consumption with the respect to the
other two cryptosystems is likely to depend from this reason. The other two cryptosys-
tems, instead, show simpler memory profiles. In their case, since the maximum amount
of memory threshold is never reached, the use of the Java Garbage Collector module is
reduced. In Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 the horizontal scale axis is not relevant because it
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Figure 4.9: Memory usage profile of ECDSA when processing a 160-bit signature
4.7.2 Energy efficiency
A cryptosystem running on a mobile device may put its CPU on a heavy load and signif-
icantly drain the underlying battery, as witnessed by several contributions in this field
(56, 57, 58). This consumption is proportional to the execution time of the cryptosys-
tem and to the complexity of the involved cryptographic operations. The expectations
are that performing a signature using ECDSA instead of RSA or DSA is less energy-
expensive because this cryptosystem uses simpler operations and shorter keys. When
performing a signature verification, it is also expected that RSA is much more energy
saving than DSA and ECDSA since it is able to perform this operation faster.























Figure 4.10: N95-8GB power consumption when signing a message using a 1.024 bits key
cryptosystems when performing a signature and a verification on a message using a
security level equivalent to 1.024 bits RSA key.
The measurements have been taken by running the SEESMS client application
on a Nokia N95-8GB using the Nokia Energy Profiler tool. Figure 4.10 shows the
energy required to perform one signature using the cryptosystems currently supported
by SEESMS. Despite the expectations, the energetic cost of the ECDSA algorithm
(∼ 0, 79 Watts) is higher than RSA and DSA algorithms (∼ 0, 76 Watts). Moreover,
since ECDSA execution time is longer than the other two algorithms, its overall energy
consumption (∼ 1, 04 Joule) results to be larger than RSA (∼ 0, 25 Joule) and DSA
(∼ 0, 15 Joule).
Figure 4.11 shows the energy consumption of one signature verifications using the
supported cryptosystems with a key strength of 1.024 bits. Even in this case the Watts
consumption for the ECDSA algorithm (∼ 0, 77 Watts) is higher than RSA (∼ 0.70
Watts) and DSA algorithms (∼ 0, 68 Watts). Moreover, it is interesting to observe that
the overall energetic consumption of the ECDSA algorithm (∼ 1, 23 Joule) is higher
than RSA (∼ 0, 03 Joule) and DSA (∼ 0, 20 Joule), due to its longer verification time.
4.8 Optimization
The poor overall performance of ECDSA and its suspicious memory usage graph mo-
























Figure 4.11: N95-8GB power consumption when verifying a message using a 1.024 bits
key
this algorithm. The purpose of this investigation was to understand if these bad per-
formance were due to algorithmic reasons or to some implementation defects. In this
section, we further profile the inner behavior of the ECDSA implementation we have
been using, we pinpoint some serious performance issues and, finally, we experiment
with several optimizing algorithmic techniques in order to improve its speed. The dis-
cussion is organized according to the chronological order we have followed when trying
the different optimizations, with all the succeeding optimization techniques applied in
an incremental way over the original ECDSA and, in some case, RSA cryptosystems.
4.8.1 Optimizing memory usage
In our previous experiments on the memory usage of ECDSA (see, e.g., Figure 4.9), we
have observed that there may be some issues with the way this cryptosystem manages
its own memory. Namely, we have seen that ECDSA requires about 100 times the
memory used by the equivalent RSA implementation. Moreover, we noticed that during
its execution, the algorithm performs many memory allocations/deallocations. Indeed,
this behavior may have a strong negative influence on the performance of the algorithm
because of the time overhead required to perform memory related operations.
Starting from these observations, we focused our attention on the data types used
by the ECDSA implementation available with the Bouncy Castle library, and on the
way they are used in the implementation. A quick analysis revealed that the most
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resource-consuming data type used by this algorithm is the one implemented by the
BigInteger class, which serves to store an integer number of arbitrary length. The
weak point of this data type is that is implemented as an Immutable object, that is:
every time an instance of this object has to change the value it represents, a new
instance has to be created to store the new value. It is interesting to note that the
original BigInteger implementation available with the J2SE framework relies on the
existence of an additional BigInteger implementation which is mutable. Instead, the
J2ME framework does not implement the BigInteger class, in fact it is provided by
the BC library.
As a confirmation of our intuition, we have seen that during the processing of a
160 bit based signature on a mobile device, ECDSA required the allocation of approx-
imately 100.000 BigInteger objects. Instead, by running the same code on a desktop
environment and using the native J2SE BigInteger implementation, we have seen that




























Figure 4.12: Memory usage profile of ECDSA and ECDSA OPT1 when processing a
160-bit signature
We then optimized ECDSA by replacing the original BigInteger class coming
with BC with a porting of the mutable one available with the J2SE framework. The re-
sulting code, which we called ECDSA OPT1, exhibits a much more regular memory
usage pattern than ECDSA and requires about 800 kbytes instead of 5.400 kbytes,
as shown in Figure 4.12. This optimization has also a significant impact on the run-
ning times of the algorithms, which are now about six times faster than the original
implementation (see Table 4.2 ). We performed the same optimization on the RSA
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implementation by replacing the original BigInteger class with the new one. The re-
sulting implementation, RSA OPT1, is about the 30% faster than the original RSA
implementation.
Table 4.2: ECDSA signature times (in ms) on an N95-8GB device
Curves ECDSA ECDSA OPT1 RSA RSA OPT1
secp112r2 461 112 49 27
secp128r2 596 132 86 63
secp160r2 1020 184 236 164
secp192r1 1651 332 735 499
secp224r1 2343 481 1666 1127
secp256r1 3096 568 5503 3588
4.8.2 Optimizing running times
Despite the memory optimizations described in Section 4.8.1, ECDSA OPT1 still
remains significantly slower than RSA when used to perform digital signatures with
large keys. A careful profiling of this algorithm revealed that, in this case, it spends
more than the 95% of its execution time to perform scalar multiplications, i.e., the
product of a big scalar value and the representation of a curve point in affine coordi-






Considering that the expected number of ones in the binary representation of k is
about m/21, the expected number of operations needed to carry out a scalar multipli-
cation is approximately m/2 point additions and m point doublings.
A common approach to the optimization of this operations uses, first, the Non-
Adjacent Form (59) (NAF) technique to minimize the number of points additions to
do, and then, the Fixed-base Windowing method (60) to precalculate some of the
intermediate values required by a scalar multiplication.
1In our context k is the private key.
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4.8.2.1 The NAF algorithm




i where ki ∈ {0,±1}, kl−1 6= 0, and no two consecutive digits ki are
nonzero. The length of the NAF is l.
For every integer positive k, the NAF expression has the following properties which
can be exploited to improve the performance of the elliptic curve scalar multiplier:
1. k has a unique NAF denoted NAF(k).
2. NAF(k) has the fewest nonzero digits of any signed digit representation of k.
3. The length of NAF(k) is at most one more than the length of the binary repre-
sentation of k.
4. If the length of NAF(k) is l, then 2l/3 < k < 2l+1/3.
5. The average density of nonzero digits among all NAFs of length l is approximately
1/3.
NAF(k) can be efficiently computed using an algorithm that generates the digits of
the NAF(k) by repeatedly dividing k by 2.
NAF can be defined in a more general way using a parameter w (window) and hence
processing w digits of k at time.
Let w ≥ 2 be a positive integer. A width-w NAF of a scalar k is a signed digit
representation in the form of k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i where each nonzero coefficient |ki| is odd,
|ki| < 2w−1, kl−1 6= 0, and at most one of any w consecutive digits is nonzero. The
length of the width-w NAF is l.
Let k be a positive integer.
1. k has a unique width-w NAF denoted NAFw(k).
2. NAF2(k) = NAF (k).
3. The length of NAFw(k) is at most one more than the length of the binary repre-
sentation of k.




4.8.2.2 The fixed-base windowing method
The fixed-base windowing method for point multiplication exploits the fact that if the
point P is known (as in the case of ECDSA) and some storage is available, then the
point multiplication can be sped up by precomputing some data which depends only
on P . For example, if the points 2P , 22P , 2P . . . . , 2m−1P are precomputed, then the
expected time required for the scalar multiplier would be m/2 additions.
Let (kd−1, . . . , k1, k0)2w be the 2

















kP = Q2w−1 + (Q2w−1 + Q2w−2) + . . . + (Q2w−1 + Q2w−2 + . . . + Q1). (4.1)
The fixed-base windowing method is based on (4.1) and its expected running time
is approximately ((d(2w − 1)/2w − 1) + (2w − 2))A.
Table 4.3: Overall number of ECPoint objects initializations, additions and doublings
required by ECDSA and ECDSA OPT2
ECDSA ECDSA OPT2




We implemented another variant of ECDSA, called ECDSA OPT2, that uses the
window-NAF coding for the scalar k and the fixed-base windowing method. The size
w of the window has been chosen in such a way to optimize the trade-off between the
number of multiplications saved by precomputation and the number of fields operations
required to perform it. In Table 4.3 we report some statistics about the improvement on
the overall number of operations to be performed when producing an ECDSA signature
using ECDSA OPT2 rather than ECDSA. This improvement affects also the per-
formance of ECDSA OPT2 which results to be much faster than ECDSA OPT1,
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as clearly visible in Table 4.4: the performance improvement is noteworthy as this new
variant requires less than the 10% of the time required by ECDSA OPT1 and about
the 2% of the time required by ECDSA. We also observe a significant improvement on
the memory usage of ECDSA OPT2, which is approximately the 10% of the memory
used by ECDSA OPT1 (see Figure 4.13).
Table 4.4: ECDSA signature times (in ms) on an N95-8GB device
Curves ECDSA ECDSA OPT1 ECDSA OPT2
secp112r2 461 112 17
secp128r2 596 132 24
secp160r2 1020 184 38
secp192r1 1651 332 43
secp224r1 2343 481 46





























Figure 4.13: Memory usage profile of ECDSA, ECDSA OPT1 and ECDSA OPT2
when processing a 160-bit signature
4.8.3 Overall experimental results
The several optimizations discussed so far led to ECDSA OPT2, a variant of ECDSA
that exhibits a significant performance improvement with respect to the original im-
plementation. We have been able to improve as well the performance of RSA through

































Figure 4.14: RSA and ECDSA signature generation times (in ms) on an N95-8GB device
using optimizations
the optimized version of the BigInteger data type. We now turn our attention to the
way these new implementations compare to each other from differ viewpoints. Con-
cerning time performance, ECDSA OPT2 is extremely more efficient than ECDSA
when signing messages and performs much better than the RSA-based implementa-
tions, also for short keys. This is shown in Figure 4.14. We also observed a significant
speed-up of ECDSA OPT2 over ECDSA when verifying the signature of a message,
as visible in Figure 4.15. In this case, the RSA-based implementations remain the
fastest cryptosystems, however ECDSA OPT2 exhibits approximately the same or-
der of growth. Concerning memory usage, the space requirements of ECDSA OPT2
are slightly higher than those of RSA OPT1 because of the overhead to be paid for
precalculating and storing in memory the points to be used by the fixed-base windowing
method (see Figure 4.16).
Finally, we briefly discuss the impact of these optimizations on the overall amount
of energy consumed by the considered algorithms. The Watt consumption per second
is almost unaffected by all the optimizations we have introduced however, the shorter
execution times imply smaller amount of energies to be spent for performing the sig-
nature and verification operations, as it can be seen in Figures 4.17 and 4.18. Anyway,
the energetic cost of these operations does not have a significant impact on the typical





























































Figure 4.16: Memory usage profile of RSA OPT1 and ECDSA OPT2 when process-
























Figure 4.17: N95-8GB power consumption when signing a message using a 1.024 bits key






















Figure 4.18: N95-8GB power consumption when verifying a message using a 1.024 bits
key using optimized algorithm and implementation
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Public and private sectors extensively rely upon 3G mobile networks for communicating
sensitive technical, financial, political and personal informations. Videoconference is
a service increasingly used for business and top-management affairs. A reliable video-
conference service might be available always and everywhere. For example, a company
manager might be able to perform a business videoconference in high-mobility envi-
ronments as traveling by train or in isolated places as staying on boat quite far from
the coast. 3G mobile networks provide circuit-switched channels with bandwidth and
Quality of Service (QoS) constraints which cannot always be satisfied by IP-based con-
nections in relation to reachability and availability requirements.
Contrary to IP networks, terminals in 3G networks are not affected by addressing
problems: every device equipped with an USIM is automatically connected to the
mobile-phone network and available through its telephone number to other mobile
devices. Moreover, the UMTS network provides a suitable Quality of Service for real-
time communications: guaranteed (even though low) bandwidth (64Kb/s), latency
constraints and network-level transparency. The circuit-switched connection between




Telecommunication companies have spent a big effort for the spreading, the global
coverage, and the amount of different services provided to the users, such as videotele-
phony, text messaging and data communication, but less effort have been spent to
provide suitable end-to-end security mechanism for those services. In fact, voice, text
and video communications carried by means of 3G networks have been shown to be vul-
nerable to eavesdropping and unauthorized access. Both wireless data link and wired
part of the network suffer several security threats.
Services provided by the modern third-generation (3G) telecommunication tech-
nology can be split into two classes, each in charge of two different network domains:
Circuit Switched (CS) and Packet Switched (PS) domain. Different domains provide
different services, for example, videotelephony is routed to the CS domain while IP
networking take place in the PS domain.
As long as videotelephony is essentially a data communication, both CS and PS
domains on the 3G networks are suitable for this service. The adoption of the PS
has many advantages but also some important drawbacks with respect to the CS. The
biggest advantage consists in the use of the IP protocol, which ensure interoperability
with almost all network applications for both mobile and desktop devices. IP security
protocols such as SSL, IPSEC and VPN, and already designed systems for end-to-
end security at application level can be re-used almost without modifications. Even if
effective and easy-to-use solutions have been presented for voice/video communications
over IP networks, an effective and reliable videotelephony service has reachability and
availability requirements which can’t be always satisfied by an IP based mobile network.
As long as the the mobile networks have not a global coverage, handover processes and
high Bit Error Rate (BER) on the wireless links tend to make the channel unstable.
On the contrary, the CS network connections are more stable in high-mobility and
high-BER conditions, granting reachability and availability requirements to the users.
In this work we defined a metric to evaluate the communication service based on
the following key performance indicators: voice and video quality, user data privacy
and application impact on the battery life. These metrics are often related to the
domain that provide the service. Generally, videotelephony over the CS domain results
in a better quality and battery saving with respect to the PS domain. In fact, the
CS connection between the endpoints is provided by the telecommunication network
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with a higher QoS value and is managed by the BSs, instead of the IP connection
that is to be managed by the peers. To the contrary, applications running over the
CS domain must comply with inflexible network protocols through which is hard to
provide the same security level of the applications running over IP. Scope of this work
is to improve security of videotelephony over CS domain, in order to achieve an optimal
quality/security/battery-life tradeoff.
5.1.1 Trusting
When an end-user subscribes a cell-phone contract implicitly trusts the network op-
erator which is supposed to preserve the communication privacy. Therefore, mobile
operator must guarantee adequate security measures to accomplish this task. In 3G
mobile networks, whereas channel encryption has been adopted for wireless links, user
data on wired links is transmitted in clear introducing several threats. Moreover, 3G
networks extensively rely on roaming following agreement signed between two or more
operators. This means that end-users should trust the roaming operator too as long as
the physical telecommunication channel is managed by another company.
Network and intra-network domain security are actually covered by Mobile Ap-
plication Part Security (MAPSec)(15) protocol, that provide security support for the
MAP(61) protocol. The MAP protocol plays a central role in the signaling communi-
cations between the Network Elements (NEs). User profile exchange, authentication,
and mobility management are performed using MAP. MAP typically runs over the Sig-
naling System number 7 (SS7) protocol stack(62). MAPSec protocol protects MAP
messages trough a packet-encapsulation mechanism.
It is important to note that the mobile station is not affected by network domain
security. The two communicating NEs may both be in the same network administrated
by the same telecommunication operator or they may belong to two different networks
administrated by two different companies. Because MAPSec only provides encryption
of MAP signalling messages but not user traffic, unauthorized communication intercep-
tions, performed by malicious users who have access to the physical telecommunication
infrastructure, are a real threat.
Encryption at network level may raise some issues. Assuming that an end-to-end
user communication pass through a lot of network elements, interoperability between
different mobile operator networks may be harder to reach because cryptographic keys
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management and security protocols should be deployed among network elements man-
aged by different providers. Moreover, there exists authorities that must be able to
perform phone tapping, for example in many countries there are laws against terror-
ism which enforce the ability of the operators to intercept the communications related
to a suspect user. Encryption at network level and cryptographic keys management
between each couple of network elements may also interfere with these tasks.
Substantially, user traffic may be transmitted encrypted through all network links
and entities to avoid unauthorized interceptions, encryption at network-level may cause
administrative issues due to VNOs, and at the same time a third-trusted-part must be
able to easily decrypt communications to allow authorized phone tapping.
The solution proposed in this chapter is an end-to-end security mechanism for 3G
video-telephony based on a cryptosystem able to include fair mechanisms for key-escrow
allowing authorized network eavesdropping.
5.1.2 Security background
In 1999, with the standardization process of third-generation (3G) mobile-phone net-
works, the 3GPP1 consortium, which is in charge of producing technical specifications
for the 3G mobile networks, proposed improved security mechanisms for wireless chan-
nel with respect to the GSM ones, which were shown to be vulnerable. The 3GPP
introduced a stronger authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol performed by
mobile device and network, and a stronger cryptosystem for wireless data encryption
(A5/3 based on KASUMI(63)). However, effective attacks which can lead to the decryp-
tion of the communication channel has been discovered. Keller and Shamir presented
an attack on KASUMI which allows to recover a full A5/3 key using a related-key
attack(64). Karsten et al.(65) showed how to perform a semi-active attack jamming
UMTS frequencies and forcing the mobile device to switch in GSM mode. Using the
Karsten technique an attacker can ask the USIM to reuse a previous A5/3 key for a
breakable obsolete GSM encryption protocol, as A5/1, and can decrypt a previously
intercepted conversation.
There exists some projects addressing application-level end-to-end security of voice
communications over mobile-telephony networks, as SPEECH which is discussed in
this Thesis. However, until this Thesis, it doesn’t seem to exist any public research
1The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), http://www.3gpp.org/
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addressing application-level security of video-telephony communications over 3G mobile
networks.
5.1.3 Outline
The rest of the chapter is organized as follow. Section 5.2 presents the state of the art
in the voice and video communication security solutions. In Section 5.3 the 3G-324M
communication protocol is described while in Section 5.5 the integrations aimed to
enhance the security of the protocol are discussed.
5.2 Requirements
The main goal of this work is to present a system that realize a secure video-call over
3G mobile networks with following requirements:
• Strong end-to-end user authentication through digital certificates. To
achieve the strong end-to-end user authentication requirement, we suppose that
the user has requested and received a X.509 digital certificate issued by a trusted
Certification Authority (CA) stored securely on the mobile equipment.
• End-to-end user communication encryption. The audio, video and data
channel encryption requirement can be achieved using robust and well-known
encryption algorithms. The authentication protocols must also implement key-
agreement mechanisms in order to initialize the channel encryption.
• Compatibility with video-telephony protocols. The proposed solution must
be compatible with existing applications and must be possible to implement it
with no modifications to the video-telephony protocol.
• Infrastructure-side transparency. It is required that no extra effort should
be spent by the network elements to realize the described end-to-end security
mechanisms, therefore the protocol data and encrypted data must be transmitted
between users as normal network traffic.
• Limited impact on system performance. The introduction of security mech-
anisms should not considerably affect the system performance and the user expe-
rience. For instance, the initial handshake should not delay the communication
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for an amount of time longer than few seconds. Analogously, during the conver-
sation, communication delays due to data encryption should not be longer than
300 milliseconds.
• Device constraints. In order to cope with the low processing power and to save
battery life of the mobile devices, local computations and end-to-end communi-
cations must me minimized. To meet this, the secure video-call system should
implement public-key encryption schemes based on the Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy1 (ECC) instead of traditional public key cryptosystems.
5.3 Video-telephony over UMTS
In this section a briefly introduction to the 3G video-telephony protocol is presented in
order to explain as it can be extended with support for security mechanisms.
3G-324M(66) is the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) umbrella protocol
for video telephony in 3G mobile networks. The 3G-324M protocol operates over an
established circuit switched connection between two communicating peers. 3G-324M is
based on the International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication standard-
ization sector (ITU-T)2 H.324M specification for multimedia conferencing over Circuit
switched networks.
3G-324M does not support end-to-end user-level security mechanisms but security
only depends on network-level protocols in charge of the network.
3G-324M is a derivative of the existing ITU-T recommendation H.324 for low bit-
rate media communication, which was initially intended for video telephony using
modem-based communication over the GSTN.
One of the key concepts of H.324 is that of logical channels. Logical channel number
0 (LCN0) is dedicated to control information. Using LCN0 the terminal can immedi-
ately start sending and receiving control information following the syntax and semantics
defined in ITU-T recommendation H.245, allowing it to declare its capabilities and dis-
cover the capabilities of the remote terminal.
1With respect to RSA, ECC offers equivalent security with smaller key sizes, which results in faster
computations, lower power consumption as well as memory and bandwidth savings.
2International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, http://
www.itu.int/ITU-T/
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H.223 provides the multiplexing function for H.324.
The simple retransmission protocol (SRP) layer between the H.245 control process
and the multiplexer is designed to provide reliable, acknowledged transmission of control
information.
Annex C of H.324 was introduced as a result of studies on how H.324 could be
adapted for use over wireless and mobile networks, initially focusing on such technolo-
gies as digital enhanced cordless telecommunications (DECT). H.324 with Annex C has
become known as H.324M. Annex C removes the modem requirements for H.324 and
assumes that a transparent digital channel is available. Annex C provides enhanced
mechanisms for robustly multiplexing and error resilience with respect to H.324.
Annex C also provides enhanced procedures for more reliable delivery of H.245
control messages by specifying the use of numbered SRP (NSRP) instead of SRP. A
layer known as the control segmentation and reassembly layer (CCSRL) is introduced
between the H.245 signaling entities and the NSRP layer. The purpose of CCSRL is
to segment larger control messages, to reduce the susceptibility of control messages to
error.
5.3.1 3G-324M
3GPP has taken H.324M as starting point and modified it to create 3G-324M. For
Release 99 the principal differences between 3G-324M and H.324M are in the codecs
supported. The mandatory audio codec for 3G-324M is GSM-AMR(67), H.263(68)
remains the mandatory video codec and MPEG4 Simple Profile Level 0 is added to the
list of optional video codecs.
The Fig.5.1 shows the extended 3G-324M architecture: the white modules com-
pose the original protocol, the gray ones are added to provide support for security
mechanisms.
The Application Layer (AL) represents the existing video-telephony application and
is not part of the 3G-324M protocol stack. It interacts with the H.245 module which
provide the support to set up and manage the call. The Control of Security Layer
(CSL) is an added middleware which provide to the AL the possibility to initialize
and manage security protocols. It uses the reliable H.245 protocol to interact with the
peer. The AL also sends to and receives data from the Audio/Video (A/V) modules,
which take in charge the communication of the multimedial streams. A/V data can
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pass trough an Encryption Layer (EL) which provide the encryption functions for the
outgoing streams and the decryption functions for the ingoing streams.
The multiplexing and de-multiplexing procedures are addressed by the H.223 pro-
tocol, which directly interact with the 3G modem to communicate with the network.
It is important to note that the proposed extensions do not impact over the existing
video-telephony protocol and can be transparently integrated within 3G-324M.
5.3.1.1 Considerations on the video codecs
The video codecs employed in the 3G-324M protocol have particular characteristics
which are to be considered for the correct design of the 3G-324M security framework.
On the transmitter side, H.263 and MPEG-4 codecs produce variable-length frames
which are divided into Group Of Blocks (GOBs) to be sent at the multiplexing level.
Every GOB has a resynchronization marker to reduce the error propagation caused by
the nature of Variable Length Code (VLC) into single frame. The resynchronization
marker is inserted at the top of a new GOB with the header information so that
decoding can be done independently.
On the receiver side, blocks are received one-by-one from the multiplexing layer
and are buffered until the reception of a resynchronization marker, which indicates the
begin of a new GOB. The received GOB is recomposed using the information of its
header and is passed to the video codec for the decoding.
5.4 A secure video-calling system
The 3G-324M-Security project (3G-324M-Sec) consists of a framework which extend
3G-324M and allows to integrate security mechanisms into the existing video-telephony
protocol, without modifications to the video-telephony protocol. The 3G-324M-Sec
high-level architecture is shown in the Fig.5.1. The white components represent the
existing 3G-324M modules, explained in the Section 5.3, and the grey components are
the 3G-324M-Sec meta-modules. The Security Control Layer includes the configuration
module and the key-agreement and authentication protocols. The Encryption Layer
includes the audio, video and text encryption mechanisms. 3G-324M-Sec supports
a lot of security-related functions as user authentication through digital certificates,
communication encryption and data integrity.
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Figure 5.1: 3G-324M-Sec high-level architecture
Efficiency requirements are addressed employing robust and well-known implemen-
tations of the encryption protocols and techniques to reduce the communication over-
load. Cryptographic algorithms themselves have been chosen according to these re-
quirements, for example, elliptic-curve based algorithms have been adopted as long
as they guarantee the same security level of traditional encryption algorithms more
efficiently.
3G-324M-Sec is compatible with UMTS network protocols. The 3G-324M-Sec con-
trol data is exchanged through the H.245 control protocol and the encrypted data
is encapsulated in fully UMTS-compatible network packets. The transmissions are
network-side transparent. The system also performs an auto-discovery procedure to
determine if the peer is compatible or not with the security extensions.
Robust, well-known and efficient technologies have been employed:
5.4.1 Authentication and key-agreement
Whenever the two video-calling applications established the communication channel
through the 3G-324M protocol, the users can initiate a secure conversation running
a key agreement protocol through the 3G-324M-Sec extensions. The purpose of these
protocols is to generate a common session key to be used to encrypt voice, video and text
data streams and, optionally, to verify the identity of the parties of the conversation.
3G-324M-Sec supports three different forms of user authentication and key agree-
ment schemes, each with a different level of security.
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Those schemas produce a shared random secret which is processed by the PBKDF2
(Password-Based Key Derivation Function) - which is part of RSA Laboratories’ Public-
Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, specifically PKCS #5 v2.0 (69) - to gen-
erate the cryptographic keys for the symmetric ciphers currently in use.
• Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Whenever two users initiate
a new conversation, 3G-324M-Sec permits to run the 521-bit prime Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) (70) key-exchange protocol to agree on a common secret
key. This form of agreement does not guarantee to the user the identity of the
other end-point of the conversation but it is enough when we are just interested
in guaranteeing the confidentiality of a conversation.
• Passphrase based key agreement. Two users interested in having a secure
conversation choose a common passphrase. Whenever a new secure conversation
has to be initiated, they will generate each a new common secret using the shared
passphrase. The reuse of the same passphrase is always possible, because the
generated common secret, and consequently the session keys, will be never the
same as the key-exchange algorithm is based on the exchange of encrypted random
values. This approach provides with a basic form of authentication since it is
expected that the passphrases are known only by their legitimate owners.
• Certificate based key agreement. Two users initiating a new secure conver-
sation own a legitimate X.509 digital certificate which has been previously loaded
in their device. Moreover, the certificates of the root CAs must be available on
the devices in order to verify the validity of the peer certificate. If these conditions
are met, the two parties use the standard TLS 1.0 protocol[DiAA99] to perform
the mutual authentication and keys agreement. The call originator plays the role
of client in the TLS protocol while the receiver of the call play the server role.
According to the TLS specification, each client submits its X.509 certificate and
provides its verification.
5.4.2 Encryption
AES with 256-bit key in OFB mode has been chosen to encrypt the communication
channels. The AES algorithm is one of the most commonly employed encryption stan-
dard and has been chosen due to its proven robustness and efficiency. The OFB mode
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avoids bit error propagation and does not affect error resilience mechanism of underly-
ing communication levels.
The audio, video and text user data can be encrypted after the previous key-
agreement phase.
5.4.3 Data integrity
HMAC-MD5 function is implemented to provide a data-integrity mechanism.
5.4.3.1 Keys
The PBKDF2 function derives the cryptographic keys from the secret shared through
the key-agreement protocol. It generates six 256-bit cryptographic keys, each employed
for a single unidirectional data stream:
• Output audio encryption
• Input audio decryption
• Output video encryption
• Input video decryption
• Output IM encryption / HMAC generation
• Input IM decryption / HMAC verification
5.4.4 Side effects
A textual Instant Messaging (IM) protocol with security extensions has been imple-
mented exploiting the H.245 control channel. The IM protocol is a proof-of-concept
utility which demonstrates that arbitrary data can be exchanged between the video-call
participants.
This result opens the way to a large number of promising applications, for example,
it could replace the actual SMS technology used for device-to-device alerting systems.
Unlike SMS, the designed messaging protocol can guarantee reliability and real-time
delivery.
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5.4.5 3G-324M-Sec prototype
A 3G-324M-Sec prototype has been developed in order to test the robustness and the
efficiency of the system in a real environment. The experiments has been conducted
with success using personal computers equipped with UMTS Tokens. The prototype
do not require a high level of technical knowledge therefore can be used by non-skilled
users in a large set of real use-cases.
5.5 Designing a security framework for UMTS video-telephony
3G-324M-Sec has been designed using a bottom-up approach, that is, lower-level mod-
ules have been first projected.
Figure 5.2: XOR-module
5.5.1 Proof of concept
The 3G-324M-Sec protocol expects that non-standard data can be transmitted between
the video-call users, that is, audio/video encrypted packets can be routed through the
telecommunication network and the network entities can treat them as common packets.
To confirm this hypothesis a preliminary experiment has been conducted.
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As shown in Fig.5.2, a XOR-module is integrated in the existing protocol stack
to test the reaction of the network to the transmission of audio packets containing
encrypted payload data. The new module is placed between the audio codec module and
the multiplexing module. It performs a one-time-pad xor encryption and decryption,
respectively, of the output and input audio data using a pre-loaded key.
A Video XOR module similar to the Audio XOR module has been introduced in
the 3G-324M protocol to verify the possibility to exchange encrypted video packets
during a video-call. Whereas the Video XOR module can be placed between the video
codec module and the multiplexer module as the Audio XOR (Fig.5.2), it must have
a different behavior. In fact, it must consider the particular characteristics the video
codec, as explained in 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Encryption Layer
5.5.2 Encryption layer
The Audio and Video XOR experiment have been conducted with success and confirmed
that the network-level protocols are completely unaware of the application-level traffic,
so application-level encryption is possible.
The XOR module shown in Fig.5.2 has been replaced by the Encryption Layer (EL),
as shown in Fig.5.3. The EL is composed of two sub-modules which are the Audio EL
and the Video EL.
The EL implements AES to encrypt/decrypt the audio/video streams. Four crypto-
graphic keys are generated using the PBKDF2: audio encryption key, audio decryption
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key, video encryption key, video decryption key. These are derived from a common
pre-shared secret.
On the transmitter, the Audio EL takes the AMR audio as input and encrypt it
using AES. The Video EL runs a similar procedure encrypting not the entire video
frame but the single blocks, as explained in 5.5.1.
On the receiver, the EL behavior is reversed. The EL takes encrypted packets
coming from the multiplexing module as input and use the appropriate key to decrypt
them. The plain-text data is subsequently passed to the higher protocol layers.
Figure 5.4: Control Layer
5.5.3 Control layer
The EL described in 5.5.2 has a basic behavior. It derives the cryptographic keys
from a common pre-shared secret not performing any key-agreement or authentication
protocol. The Control Layer (CL) is introduced to provide procedures to configure and
manage the security mechanisms. As shown in Fig.5.4, it directly interacts with the
AL and the EL.
At this design level, it provides a procedure to specify the passphrase used by the
PBKDF2 function which generates the stream-specific cryptographic keys. Moreover,
it provides a function to enable/disable on-the-fly the security extensions. The on-the-
fly activation function can be useful, for example, to avoid the cryptographic overhead
if encryption is not necessary.
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5.5.4 Reliable transport adapter layer
Guaranteed data delivery is crucial for the proper functioning of Authentication and
Key-Agreement protocols, that is, an only single bit error causes the entire re-execution
of the protocol. The extremely high bit error rate of the wireless links ( 10−3 ≤ BER ≤
10−2 ) is worked around implementing a reliable transport layer over the H.245 control
protocol.
As explained in the section 5.3, H.245 provides reliable, acknowledged transmission
of control information and segmentation of larger messages. Moreover, it provides sup-
port for user-defined communication through the UserInputIndication message, origi-
nally introduced to simulate the transmission of DTMF tones over digital networks. In
particular, the UserInputIndication message is defined in the H.245 standard using the
ASN.1 encoding and permits to exchange arbitrary alphanumeric strings between the
peers.
Figure 5.5: Reliable Transport Adapter Layer - message transmission
The Reliable Transport Adapter Layer (RTAL) exploits the UserInputIndication
mechanism to provide procedures to open virtual streams between the peers and trans-
mit general-purpose data structures. The RTAL interface exposes a basic symmetric
non-blocking put(), which send data on an opened virtual stream, and a symmetric
blocking get(), which receive data from a opened virtual stream. The Fig.5.5 schema-
tize the RTAL operation of sending data.
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5.5.5 Authentication
The introduction of the RTAL opened the way to the implementation of a largest
set of cryptographic protocols over 3G-324M. In particular, the system incudes some
robust well-known authentication and key-exchange protocols as SSL and ECDH (see
the section 5.4 for the specifications). To integrate an existing implementation of the
SSL protocol, it is enough to create an adapter which instantiates the virtual streams
through the RTAL functions and binds the imported I/O streams to the new ones.
5.5.6 Session control layer
The Session Control Layer (SCL) is subsequently introduced to completely abstract
the cryptographic protocols from the 3G-324M-Sec system. It performs all the session-
specific operations as cryptographic keys management, EL initialization, virtual streams
initialization. At the same time, it abstracts the AL from the underlying authentication
protocol.
With the introduction of the RTAL and the growing complexity of the cryptographic
protocols implemented in 3G-324M-Sec, the old CL became divided in two sub-layers:
the previously described RTAL and the new Session Control Layer (SCL). The overall
3G-324M-Sec architecture is shown in Fig.5.6.
Figure 5.6: Overall 3G-324M-Sec structure
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5.5.7 Secure instant messaging protocol
A Secure Instant Messaging (SecIM) protocol has been also designed exploiting the
H.245 control channel. The SecIM protocol provides encryption and data integrity for
textual messages. It demonstrates the flexibility of the RTAL managing general-purpose
communication protocols.
The SecIM protocol can be used during both secured and non-secured video-calls,
without service interruption. It can be useful, for example, to communicate a credit
card number, payment informations etc.
5.5.8 Implemented protocol stack
Figure 5.7: 3G-324M-Sec Implementation Stack
A 3G-324M-Sec prototype working in a real environment has been developed. The
prototype runs on PC equipped with UMTS usb tokens and has been developed for
Windows XP/7 platforms.
The overall implementation is in standard ANSI C++ and the used IDE is Visual
Studio 2008. The project consists of more than three thousands of source files and
headers. OpenSSL has been used to implement the SSL handshake. Implementations
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of ECDH, Passphrase authentication and AES has been imported from the SPEECH
project, which employs the MIRACL1 library for high-precision operations on elliptic
curves.
The Fig.5.7 shows the 3G-324M-Sec implementation stack. The video-call users
interact with the 3G-324M-Sec GUI module, which sends commands to the 3G-324M-
Sec application logic. The SCL module manages the authentication and key-agreement
procedures, and interacts with the EL, which creates the encrypted data channels. The
data delivery is demanded to the 3G-324M protocol implementation, which directly
interacts with the hardware.
5.6 System performance
In order to gain a deeper understanding about the impact produced by our extension to
the original 3G-324M protocol we arranged an experimental analysis of our prototype.
Performance evaluation in such context is known to be hard task. This is mainly
due to the unpredictable side-effects introduced by the network elements (BS) used
to connect the two endpoints. In fact, depending on the BS’s load and distance this
kind of links can only increase the system entropy. Therefore our testing methodology
is only aimed to measure the effect introduced by the security modules/protocols on
the overall system performances compared with respect to the performances obtained
using the standard (unencrypted) protocols. Whereas we are not concerned in channel
bandwidth and reliability measurements.
The realized prototype has been experimented in a real environment and has shown
to be robust and flexible enough to be adopted in many network conditions. The
key-agreement and authentication protocols have been tested with success and the
network has never rejected the encrypted packets. The employed 3G-324M protocol
implementation has not shown to be performance effective for this specific application.
The overall system performance can be improved employing a more performing 3G-
324M protocol implementation.
A large set of experiments have been performed to measure the delay introduced
by the 3G-324M-Sec cryptographic extensions with respect to the common video-call.
In this section a significant set of experimental results are commented.




The methodology adopted to measure the system performances rely on the key perfor-
mance indicators discussed in 5.1.
The security strength of the secsec324 framework rely on the robustness of the
cryptographic protocols that have been employed. Even though the cryptanalysis of
such algorithms is out of the scope of this work, it is possible to consider the secsec324
system secure as long as the employed cryptosystems are considered secure.
The battery consumption strongly depends on the implementation of the secsec324
specifications and protocols. The realized prototype do not run more processes or
threads with respect to the standard video-call implementation, and the amount of
computations and data-exchanges is minimized since the implemented protocols rely
on the ECC cryptography. It has been empirically measured that a secure video-call
performing a SSL handshake and lasting 5 minutes do not discharge the device battery
more than 1/10 of the original video-call application.
The service quality has been evaluated empirically, and the secsec324 implemen-
tation has not shown to cause any detectable degradation of the user experience with
respect to the standard video-call. The empiric results have been confirmed by the
analysis of the delays introduced by the protocols and the encryption procedures.
5.6.2 Experimental setup
The prototype has been experimented using these hardware platforms:
• PC1: Notebook with CPU Intel Core Duo T2300 at 1.66GHz, SDRAM DDR2
1GB
• PC2: PC with CPU Intel Core Duo 2 E6400 at 2.13GHz, SDRAM DDR3 2GB
These devices have been used for the 3G connectivity:
• UMTS Pendrive Onda MSA523HS
• UMTS Pendrive Onda MDC502HS
The prototype has been tested on these software environments:
• Windows XP SP3
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• Windows 7 Professional
The execution time of the prototype procedures has been measured using the high-
resolution performance counter library, included in the Windows API:
• QueryPerformanceCounter()
About a hundred of experiments has been conducted for each protocol in different
environments having different UMTS network coverage, capacity and traffic load. For
example, it can be assumed that the UMTS signal strength is good in the department
laboratory and the traffic load varies during daytime. It can be also assumed that the
experiments conducted at home, located in a small provincial town, are affected by
worse UMTS signal coverage.
For the sake of simplicity, PC1 and PC2 were always nearby during the experiments,
so it is possible to suppose that they were in the same cell and received the same UMTS
signal. As explained in 5.6.3, the system performance strongly depends on the signal
quality, which is supposed to be equivalent for both endpoints. The experiments dis-
cussed in 5.6.3 have been conducted in the department laboratory, having good UMTS
signal coverage quality, so it is possible to suppose that the measured performances are
the best possible for that specific signal quality. In other words, these results indicate
an upper bound for the performance achievable by the 3G-324M-Sec prototype in a
real usage.
5.6.3 Protocols performances
Concerning the protocols performance, the execution time strongly depends on the
amount of data exchanged between the peers and the instantaneous BER of the com-
munication channel (10−2...10−3).
In substance, if T (p) is the execution time of the protocol p:
T (p) = Tc(p) + C
where Tc(p) is the time utilized by the protocol p to exchange its data structures between
the peers and C is the time utilized for the local computations.
The C value is strongly dependent on the processing power of the underlying hard-
ware, and can be assumed constant for a specific protocol running on a specific hardware
84
5.6 System performance
platform. The minimum values always have been measured on PC2, the maximum val-
ues on PC1.
The Tc(p) value depends on the UMTS signal quality and the instantaneous BER.
Generally, the experiments have shown that Tc(p) dominates C. In substance, Tc(p) is
the most relevant term of T (p), therefore it is possible to approximate T (p) ≈ Tc(p).
It is important to note that the video-telephony service is not interrupted during
the protocols execution, which runs over the out-of-band H.245 control channel. As
long as the control channel has limited bandwidth 1 and the 3G-324M protocol do not
provides mechanisms to increase its capacity, the performances of the 3G-324M-Sec
protocols decrease with increasing amount of data to be exchanged. For example, the
SSL handshake results in a significative performance loss if large size certificates are
used.
5.6.3.1 Passphrase authentication protocol
Both the peers generates a cryptographic key using the pre-shared passphrase and use
it to encrypt a data structure containing their session-specific key share and initializa-
tion vector, then send it to the other peer. The session key is generated through the
appropriate combination of the local and the remote key shares. Each transmitted data
structure is 304 byte.
The time required to transmit and receive the data structures is varying between
1678,73 and 2100,03 milliseconds, depending on the instantaneous BER. The time
required for the local computations is negligible: C < 1msec both on PC1 and PC2.
The results are summarized in Tab.5.1.
Table 5.1: Delay introduced by the Passphrase Authentication Protocol
Tc(Passphrase) Cpassphrase
Maximum 2100,03 msec < 1 ms
Minimum 1678,73 msec < 1 ms
1The 3G-324M standard (66) do not specify the bandwidth reserved for the control channel, so it
depends on the specific protocol implementation.
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5.6.3.2 Diffie-Hellman key agreement
The Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman protocol for a 521 bit key agreement consists of
some local computations (which most significant are a pair of scalar multiplications) to
calculate the ECDH parameters, which are exchanged among the peers to obtain the
common secret. Each exchanged parameter is 70 bytes.
Table 5.2: Delay introduced by the ECDH-521 data exchange
Tc(Diffie−Hellman) CDiffie−Hellman
Minimum 1171,92 msec 4 msec
Maximum 1363,27 msec 12 msec
The Tab.5.2 summarizes the measured maximum and minimum delay: it varies
between 1171,92 and 1363,27 milliseconds depending on the instantaneous BER. In this
case the C parameter is more significant: the execution time of the local computations
varies between 4 (the minimum measured on PC2) and 12 milliseconds (the maximum
measured on PC1).
It is important to note that the ECDH-521 average communication time is lesser
than the Passphrase protocol because the data to be exchanged is significantly smaller.
5.6.3.3 SSL handshake
The delay introduced by the SSL handshake has been tested using basic X.509 digital
certificates and extended X.509 certificates containing user’s photos. The execution
time strongly depends on the certificate size, which is significantly greater if photo is
added.
All the experiments have been conducted using the following certificates:
• ClientCert - 512-bit RSA certificate: 645 bytes
• PhotoClientCert - 512-bit RSA certificate with photo: 2622 bytes
• ServerCert - 512-bit RSA certificate: 645 bytes
• PhotoServerCert - 512-bit RSA certificate with photo: 2622 bytes




1. ClientHello: 94 byte.
2. ServerHello + Server certificate: 1525 byte using ServerCert, 3502 bytes using
PhotoServerCert.
3. Client certificate: 1651 bytes using ClientCert, 3756 bytes using PhotoClientCert.
4. Finish: 75 bytes.
The performance analysis has shown a communication delay of 6325,2 - 9227,11
milliseconds using the basic X.509 certificate and 17950,45 - 27876 milliseconds using
the X.509 certificates with photo.
The local timings mainly contains the execution time of the ECDH key exchange (i.e.
two scalar multiplications on the client) and the signature verification. The remaining
time is spent for protocol processing and for administrative purposes.
The Tab.5.3 shows the measured maximum and minimum timings.
Table 5.3: Delay introduced by the SSL handshake
Tc(SSL) CSSL
Basic X.509 Photo X.509 Basic X.509 Photo X.509
Maximum 17950,45 ms 27876 ms 12 ms 17 ms
Minimum 6325,2 ms 9227,11 ms 9 ms 11 ms
5.6.4 Encryption delay
The EL introduces delay in local computations, therefore delays the audio/video packets
transmission and reproduction. Since the AES decryption algorithm is symmetric with
respect to the encryption one, and in general all the pre-transmission procedures are
symmetric to the post-reception ones, it can be considered the same delay interval ∆
for encryption and decryption. It is important to note that ∆ only depends on the
local computations, therefore is strongly related to the computational capability of the
underlying hardware.
The Tab.5.4 shows the average per-packet delay measured on PC1 during an en-
crypted video-call, and the average delay introduced every 60 seconds.
It is important to note that the total delay is proportioned to the quantity of the
processed packets, resulting lower for the video traffic which has a lower sampling rate.
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Table 5.4: Delay introduced by the local computations on PC1 during a video-call
Data Type
Average Audio Video
per-packet delay 0.00821606 ms 0.0112831 ms
packets sent every 60sec 3000 900
delay every 60sec 24,65 ms 10,15 ms
The local computations introduce delay having minimum variability with respect to
the communication delay, therefore the local audio and video per-packet delays can be
considered constant on the specific hardware:
∆PC1audio ≈ 0.008milliseconds
∆PC1video ≈ 0.01milliseconds
The Tab.5.5 summarizes the same experiment conducted on PC2. As expected, the
local delays on PC2 are lesser than the local delays on PC1, because PC2 has a greater
processing power. The constant per-packet delays on PC2 are:
∆PC2audio ≈ 0.0042milliseconds
∆PC2video ≈ 0.0046milliseconds
Table 5.5: Delay introduced by the local computations on PC2 during a video-call
Data Type
Audio Video
Call duration 77012.8 ms 77012.2 ms
Number of packets 3837 1170
Average per-packet delay 0.00423322 ms 0.00467853 ms
Total delay 16.2428 ms 5.47388 ms
The Encryption Layer delays the audio and video streams by an amount of time
undetectable by an human user. As stated in 5.6.3, the most of the delay is introduced
by the authentication and key-agreement protocol execution. A number of improve-
ments for the 3G-324M-Sec performances and features are discussed in 5.7. However,
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assuming that the user authentication only happens once at the beginning of the con-
versation, and the subsequent media stream encryption do not deteriorate the overall
system performance, it can be concluded that the implemented 3G-324M-Sec prototype
is suitable for deployment in a real environment.
5.7 Future works
The experimental results of the 3G-324M-Sec protocol appear promising and encourage
further research. In particular, the 3G-324M-Sec project is a starting point to design
mechanisms for the authenticity, integrity and non repudiability of the conversation,
in order to provide a multimedial communication service which have legal validity and
can be used for remote interrogations, contracts signing, remote purchases etc. Aiming
on this purpose, we are currently working on the extensions presented below.
5.7.1 User certificate in the SIM card.
The achieved implementation of the SSL protocol over 3G-324M for user-authentication
and key agreement is an important result and can motivate the introduction of dig-
ital certificates within USIMs, both simplifying and reinforcing the realized security
infrastructure. However, this task is demanded to the mobile telephone companies.
5.7.2 Audio/Video integrity.
A possible extension of 3G-324M-Sec is the support for data integrity at Encryption
Layer. This task may be difficult due to the inflexibility of the communication protocols.
Audio and video packets have fixed size and it is possible to append information about
data integrity, for example a HMAC code, reducing the payload size. This solution led
to audio/video quality loss and do not agree with the 3G-324M specifications.
A possible solution is to exploit the H.245 control channel to send the integrity
information separately. However, it important to note that audio/video packets are
not numbered and packet loss is highly probable due to the BER, which increase the




It would be useful for both parties to have, at the end of the communication, the same
identical copy of the conversation. Such a task is not easy as it seems because both the
underlying communication channel and the transport protocol may be unreliable, and
so audio/video packets can be damaged or be lost.
Non-repudiation mechanisms can be designed over the 3G-324M-Sec framework.
The out-of-band H.245 channel could be used to perform the protocol, for example,
sending the digital signature and the integrity information of the packets.
5.7.4 Performance improvements.
The H.245 control channel represents a performance bottleneck due to its limited band-
width. As discussed in 5.6.3, the most of the delay is introduced by the protocol data
transfers. It is possible to speed up the protocol data transfers designing a reliable
transport layer over the audio/video channels, which have more bandwidth with re-




As the functionality of mobile devices becomes more diverse, Security in wireless cel-
lular communication has become an increasingly critical issue among consumers and
providers. Financial transactions as well as confidential information are daily transmit-
ted on wireless networks and the majority of users are unaware of the security issues
they may face. The main problem is that mobile communication networks do not pro-
vide any end-to-end security mechanism. Hence, eavesdropping or phishing attacks are
relatively easy to carry out. In this Thesis the security limits of the most deployed and
spread cellular communication technologies have been presented and security systems
for voice, video and text communications have beed designed and developed: SPEECH,
SEESMS and SECR3T.
The first part of this Thesis provided an introduction to Security concepts related to
wireless communications. Specifically, the first chapter showed an historical overview
of the three generation of cellular networks and basic information on what is meant by
Security in general for telecommunication systems. A short introduction on our secure
communication tools is also given. Chapter two introduced a technical view about
the Security systems adopted by network carriers to protect the wireless part of the
communication path between two communicating users and the attacks to the Security
algorithm employed.
The second part of the Thesis was focused on the design and the implementation
of SPEECH, SEESMS and SECR3T, our Security systems designed and developed for
secure, end-to-end communication over GSM (voice), SMS (text) and UMTS (voice,
video and text) communication channels. Those systems are software-only solutions
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and in particular do not require any specialized hardware configuration or device. All
of them work at application level on mobile devices and desktop PC.
SPEECH is a software tool installable on modern handheld devices, which allows
to communicate in encrypted, authenticated and signed mode using the GSM commu-
nication channel. The part of SPEECH concerning Security is completely independent
from the bearer service in use. It currently supports TLS 1.0 and preshared passphrase
as authentication/key agreement protocols, Diffie-Hellman as key agreement protocol
and channel encryption with AES256. The voice is encoded with the Speex codec
which allows to converse in fullduplex mode still with 9600 bps of band usage as upper
bound. The non-repudiation of the conversation was the main challenge. To achieve
it, we needed to design and implement a reconciliation protocol on the conversation
content which is applicable if a limited number of errors occurs. Moreover a signature
mechanism on the agreed conversation content has been provided as proof.
SEESMS is a software framework that allows two peers to exchange encrypted and
digitally signed SMS messages. SEESMS differs from the other frameworks presented
so far in literature, because it allows users to choose which cryptosystem and which
degree of Security to use. Three cryptosystems are built-in, RSA, DSA and ECDSA
and further can be added thanks to his modular architecture. An experimental analysis
of the cryptosystems available in SEESMS using several different metrics has been
conducted. A careful profiling of this library revealed some performance issues that were
responsible for the bad performance of ECDSA. We then tried some algorithmic and
programming optimization techniques for improving the performance of ECDSA. As a
result of these optimizations, we obtained two variants of the original RSA and ECDSA
implementations coming with the Bouncy Castle library which exhibit substantially
faster execution times and a reduced memory footprint.
SECR3T project demonstrated that it is possible to integrate cryptographic mecha-
nisms within the 3G-324M (and most generally H.324) protocol in a totally transparent
way for the telecommunication company, preserving compatibility with the 3G network
specifications, with a minimal delay of the communication. The SECR3T framework
consists of an implementation of an extended 3G-324M protocol which includes Secu-
rity features. Authentication and Key-Agreement protocols have been designed using
the reliable H.245 control channel. The SSL handshake protocol provides strong user
authentication employing X.509 digital certificates. The SECR3T framework provides
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encryption for voice, video and textual communication. It supports the installation of
new cryptographic protocols through its extendibility interface.
Our three software tools allow to overcome the Security limits of mobile communi-
cations networks. PKI infrastructures and X.509 digital certificates are used to allow
end-to-end user authentication and proper Security algorithms and protocols ensure
the confidentiality of the communication content. Digital signature by means of X.509
digital certificates guarantees the non-repudiation of the communication content. Us-
ing this tools, users can accomplish critical transactions (such as m-commerce, trading
online, phone banking, homeland Security) using low cost handhelds, standard com-
munication channels and without requiring additional dedicated hardware.
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